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THE JEKYLL AND HYDE STORY OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE: THE SUPREME COURT IN PHRMA V. WALSH
AND THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
Srividhya Ragavan *
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, intellectual property ("IP") protection has been a
national issue. International efforts at IP harmonization vested
discretion on national governments in imposing standards to pro-
tect IP and prevent infringement.' Countries used their discretion
to standardize IP in a manner that prioritized sovereign national
responsibilities.2 National responsibilities are issues like poverty,
health care, and local economic conditions affecting IP implemen-
tation by having a stake in development, democracy, and ordere
public.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law, Norman, Okla-
homa. This paper is a modified version of a presentation made at the symposium organ-
ized by the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, entitled "Patent Law,
Social Policy, and Public Interest: The Search for a Balanced Global System." The author
thanks Professor Peter Yu for giving her the opportunity to present the paper, and the
University of Oklahoma College of Law for providing encouragement and support. The au-
thor would like to thank Associate Dean Susan Karamanian and Professor Martin Adel-
man for their encouragement and guidance. Additionally, the author extends a very spe-
cial thanks to Professors Jay Kesan, Peter King and Drew Kershen for their guidance and
helpful comments to an earlier draft of this paper.
1. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, as last revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 1344, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, 223 [hereinaf-
ter Berne Convention); see also Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,
Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised July 14, 1967, art. 2, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 1631, 828 U.N.T.S.
305, 313 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. The lack of minimum international standards
enabled countries to set their own standards of IP protection. For example, under Article 2
of the Paris Convention, countries can have individual levels of IP protection provided the
nationals of member states are not discriminated against. Id.
2. Under the Paris Convention, countries could extend poor levels of IP protection to
the nationals of all member states as long as their nationals were treated just as poorly.
Robert Pechman, Seeking Multilateral Protection for Intellectual Property: The United
States "TRIPs" Over Special 301, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 179, 181-82 (1998).
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The Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights
("TRIPS")3 set a new trend in harmonizing IP laws by introducing
enforceable minimum international standards.4 The enforcement
provisions of TRIPS required countries to prioritize international
obligations to avoid trade sanctions.' The resulting question was:
What happens if prioritizing international obligations interferes
with fulfilling national responsibilities? At issue, among other
things, was the use of compulsory licensing and price control
mechanisms by developing nations as tools to make medication
accessible to the population.6 TRIPS signatories questioned the
extent to which these tools may be used to balance international
trade obligations with their national welfare obligations. 7
TRIPS implied that compulsory licensing could be used to pre-
serve public health. Article 31 provides the right to compulsory
licensing subject to certain conditions.' Under Article 27, TRIPS
3. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex I.C.,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS--RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS].
4. Id. arts. 15-18. See generally J. H. Reichman, Compliance with the TRIPS Agree-
ment: Introduction to a Scholarly Debate, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 363 (1996).
5. See TRIPS, supra note 3, arts. 41-50. TRIPS embodies mandatory enforcement
provisions to prevent derogation from the uniform minimum standards.
6. Patrick Marc, Compulsory Licensing and the South African Medicine Act of 1997:
Violation or Compliance of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
Agreement?, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 109, 121-22 (2001).
7. Id.
8. TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 31.
Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a
patent without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the
government or third parties authorized by the government, the following pro-
visions shall be respected:
(a) authorization of such use shall be considered on its individual mer-
its;
(b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed
user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on
reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have
not been successful within a reasonable period of time. This require-
ment may be waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency
or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-
commercial use. In situations of national emergency or other circum-
stances of extreme urgency, the right holder shall, nevertheless, be no-
tified as soon as reasonably practicable. In the case of public non-
commercial use, where the government or contractor, without making
a patent search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to know that a
valid patent is or will be used by or for the government, the right
holder shall be informed promptly;
(c) the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose
[Vol. 38:777
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advocates a product patent regime which requires all nations, in-
cluding nations with low per capita income, to embrace expensive
patented pharmaceuticals. Except for Article 31, TRIPS lacks al-
ternatives for developing nations to enable marginalized people to
access pharmaceuticals.9 Thus, TRIPS implies that Article 31
provides the option for developing nations to fulfill national re-
sponsibilities.
Developed nations, however, challenged all attempts by the de-
veloping nations to use the right to compulsorily license patents. 10
Developed nations argued that prioritizing international trade ob-
ligations in TRIPS necessitated a level of patent protection that
eliminated the option of exercising compulsory licensing and price
control mechanisms even under a threat to public health. 1 The
developed nations' persistence forced developing nations to com-
promise on national responsibilities, resulting in a "poverty pen-
alty." The term "poverty penalty" refers to the cost poorer nations
suffer from fulfilling international obligations that require priori-
tizing trade interests to the detriment of welfare. 2 Developing
nations uniquely suffered the poverty penalty because, when eco-
nomic conditions and public health threatened to deteriorate, de-
veloped nations practiced both price control and compulsory li-
censing. For example, an economic crisis within the states moved
the Supreme Court of the United States, in Pharmaceutical Re-
search and Manufacturers of America ("PhRMA") v. Walsh," to
validate indirect price control over pharmaceuticals. 4 The threat
for which it was authorized, and in the case of semi-conductor technol-
ogy shall only be for public non-commercial use or to remedy a practice
determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-
competitive.
Id. Such uses are termed as compulsory licenses.
9. Id. art. 27.
10. See, e.g., Marc, supra note 6, at 121-22 (highlighting America's opposition to at-
tempts by South Africa to legislate compulsory licensing provisions); see also discussion
infra Part III.
11. See Marc, supra note 6, at 121-22. Developed nations, particularly the United
States, disputed all efforts to compulsorily license, even under a public health exigency,
and threatened to levy punitive trade sanctions. See, e.g., Sara M. Ford, Compulsory Li-
censing Provisions Under the TRIPS Agreement: Balancing Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 941, 953-55 (2000) (discussing the United States' objections to compulsory
licensing). See generally Cecilia Oh, US Opposed to Moves to Address Public-Health Con-
cerns About TRIPS, Third World Network, at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/twrl31f.htm
(last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
12. See discussion infra Part V.A.-B.
13. 123 S. Ct. 1855 (2003) (to be filed at 538 U.S. 644).
14. Id. at 1861-62.
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of an anthrax crisis moved the United States and Canada to-
wards compulsory licensing. 5 The poverty penalty has, in effect,
undermined the ability of TRIPS to secure equivalent behavior
from all parties. 6 It exempts developed nations from fulfilling ob-
ligations developing nations are forced to fulfill and thus pun-
ishes poor nations for being poor. Contrary to popular belief, the
developing nations' loss is not from deviating from the TRIPS
commitments, but from attempting to fulfill them.17 The TRIPS
objective of promoting "social and economic welfare"" cannot be
achieved if the poverty penalty increases from forcing nations to
neglect national responsibilities. Developed nations, in refusing to
recognize developing nations' national responsibilities, stressed
the "mutual interest" that "the commitments of TRIPS" gener-
ated. 9
In articulating that Article 31 vests on the developing nations
the right to prioritize national responsibilities, this paper argues
that the poverty penalty has affected the legality of the developed
nations' arguments and violates the mutual benefit provision in
Article 7 of TRIPS.20 TRIPS embodies "a reciprocal balance of ex-
change that yields net benefits to all";2' however, "[i]f one fo-
cuse[d] not on global economic welfare but on the economic wel-
fare of developing countries, by contrast, conventional wisdom
holds that the extension of patent protection to developing coun-
tries is harmful."22 In reality, "net benefits to all"23 and "global
15. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
16. It resulted in TRIPS failing to enable developing nations to transition towards a
trade regime without affecting local public health conditions. See discussion infra Part V.
17. Alan 0. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha "So-
lution," 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 47, 60 (2002) ("The fact that the commitment from which a na-
tion seeks to deviate imposes a loss on that nation is of no moment, for that is always the
case when a nation seeks to deviate."). Id. at 60.
18. TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 7.
19. Sykes, supra note 17, at 59-60 (discussing that the effect on welfare is irrelevant
in expecting developing nations to fulfill the TRIPS commitments).
20. See id.
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should con-
tribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users
of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.
TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 7.
21. Sykes, supra note 17, at 60.
22. Id. at 58.
23. Id. at 60.
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economic welfare"2 4 have effectuated benefits only to the devel-
oped nations. It has necessitated a scrutiny of the extent to which
developing countries ought to be committed to TRIPS because the
mutual interest component of the commitment has been lost in
the bargain. Without recommending textual amendments, this
paper emphasizes the need to accommodate national responsibili-
ties in the operation of TRIPS.
The developed nations' argument that increased trade would
positively impact per capita income and ultimately benefit the
marginalized by trickling down does not convincingly account for
welfare obligations during the interim period. The increasing
marginalization of the poor within developing nations will worsen
economic conditions before stabilizing them. Conventional pru-
dence suggests that deteriorating economic conditions cannot
serve as a means to improve developing nations over a period of
time.
Part II introduces the different perceptions within developed
and developing nations over the use of compulsory licensing and
price control mechanisms. Part III discusses the developed na-
tions' objections when developing countries wanted to retain the
right to compulsory licensing as a means to fulfill national re-
sponsibilities. It also argues that Article 31 supports the develop-
ing nations' position. Part IV discusses how developed nations,
under less-threatening circumstances, prioritized national re-
sponsibilities and used the same tools they prevented developing
nations from using--compulsory licensing and price control
mechanisms. Part V demonstrates that the United States' reac-
tions resulted in the developing nations paying a poverty penalty
owing to their dependency on trade with the developed countries.
The poverty penalty, quantified as the economic value developing
nations lost due to national issues becoming international emer-
gencies, meant to further global trade by benefiting the pharma-
ceutical industry, instead resulted in an opportunity cost to the
industry.2" Part V also argues that the interests of IP harmoniza-
tion and the pharmaceutical industry will best be served through
eliminating the poverty penalty-taking cognizance of sovereign
24. Id. at 58.
25. Additionally, IP harmonization was affected when public health became a bigger
issue and developing nations wanted to derogate from TRIPS's terms vide the Doha Decla-
ration. See World Trade Organization, Doha Ministerial Declaration, Nov. 14, 2001, 41
I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
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national responsibility to prevent a public health crisis. Part VI
discusses solution options within the TRIPS framework to pro-
vide global access to medication. This paper concludes that the
legality of the TRIPS provisions will be strengthened by its prac-
tical workability to address global issues.
II. COMPULSORY LICENSING AND PRICE CONTROL MECHANISMS
The monopoly component of a patent consists of the right to
prevent competition and to charge a maximum market price.
Both compulsory licenses and price controls balance the patent
owner's right with the societal need for the product, and operate
where public interest concerns outweigh patent holders' rights.26
Hence, both affect the patentee's monopoly thus representing a
compromise between absolute revocation of patents and pat-
entee's absolute property rights over the invention.27
Compulsory licenses force the patentee to license the patent to
the government.28 Compulsory licenses, as "involuntary con-
tract[s] between a willing buyer and an unwilling seller imposed
and enforced by the state,"29 affect market exclusivity directly and
market price indirectly. Price controls, being government-induced
interferences with the market, restrict the maximum market
price." Prices can be controlled either directly or indirectly. Di-
rect price control is where the government restricts the market
26. Rafael V. Baca, Compulsory Patent Licensing in Mexico in the 1990's: The After-
math of NAFTA and the 1991 Industrial Property Law, 35 IDEA 183, 184-85 (1994); see
also David J. Henry, Multi-National Practice in Determining Provisions in Compulsory
Patent Licenses, 11 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 325 (1977). See generally Ford, supra
note 11, at 963-64 (discussing the general beliefs of developing nations in regard to com-
pulsory licensing).
27. Baca, supra note 26, at 184. Compulsory licenses allow governments "to compen-
sate for the economic shortcomings associated with not establishing a domestic industrial
base when not working an invention within its borders." Id. at 187.
28. Ford, supra note 11, at 945 ("Compulsory licensing is defined generally as the
granting of a license by a government to use a patent without the patent-holder's permis-
sion..).
29. Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales and
the Reality, 33 IDEA 349, 349 (1993) (quoting PAUL K. GORECKI, REGULATING THE PRICE
OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS IN CANADA: COMPULSORY LICENSING, PRODUCT SELECTION, AND
GOVERNMENT REIMBURSEMENT PROGRAMMES (Economic Council of Canada 1981)).
30. See Mary T. Griffin, AIDS Drugs & the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Need for Re-
form, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 363, 402 n.260 (discussing the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services Reimbursement Board's establishment of price limits at the lowest prices at
which the drug is available).
[Vol. 38:777
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price of a product from exceeding a certain percentage above the
cost of production.31 Indirect price control is where the govern-
ment uses an incentive, a deterrent, or both to prevent the manu-
facturer from realizing the highest marginal profit.32
The issues of compulsory licensing and price controls hold
unique significance in the area of pharmaceuticals. Unlike con-
sumer products, where the elasticity of individual human need
may vary with affordability, in the case of pharmaceuticals, the
demand for the product is independent of affordability.33 The ef-
fect of cost efficiency on the demand for a medication is minimal
due to the continued needs of patients, given the lack of alterna-
tives.' In low per capita income markets, like developing coun-
tries, increasing the cost reduces affordability, increases the de-
mand for medication as disease conditions worsen and thus raises
the need to use 'tools like compulsory licensing to balance trade
with welfare.35 Thus, differences in economic development have
an indirect bearing on the use of compulsory licensing.
In developed nations, the higher per capita income virtually
eliminates the need for compulsory licensing except when there is
an economic slowdown.36 Hence the patentees generally enjoy a
31. For a discussion of the types of direct and indirect restraint placed on drug prices
across the world, see generally Michele L. Creech, Comment, Make a Run for the Border:
Why the United States Government Is Looking to the International Market for Affordable
Prescription Drugs, 15 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 593 (2001).
32. Id.
33. See Griffin, supra note 30, at 367-69 (discussing the unique price and demand as-
pects of the pharmaceutical market).
34. See id. at 370 ("Price competition is an integral part of the free market enterprise
system in this country, but not of the pharmaceutical industry."); id. at 372 (explaining
how prices tend to increase when no treatment substitutes exist).
35. See Ellen 't Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha
"Solution," 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 27, 28-29 (2002); see also David K Tomar, A Look into the
WTO Pharmaceutical Patent Dispute Between the United States and India, 17 WIS. INT'L
L.J. 579, 583-85, 601 (1999) (discussing India as a specific case study and noting that pat-
ent protection will decrease pharmaceutical availability and increase prices because the
consumers will bear the cost associated with research and development); Michelle M.
Nerozzi, Note, The Battle over Life-Saving Pharmaceuticals: Are Developing Countries Be-
ing "TRIPped" by Developed Countries?, 47 VILL. L. REV. 605, 605, 618-19 (2002) (stress-
ing that over eighty-nine percent of the people living in poverty and with HIV/AIDS reside
in developing and least developed nations); Nadia Natasha Seeratan, Comment, The
Negative Impact of Intellectual Property Patent Rights on Developing Countries: An Ex-
amination of the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry, 3 SCHOLAR 339, 388 (2001) (stating that
TRIPS will result in an increased cost of medication).
36. See Srividhya Ragavan, Can't We All Just Get Along? The Case for a Workable
Patent Model, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 117, 166 (2003).
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total monopoly during the patent term.37 Patents serve as market
incentives enabling patentees to derive maximum economic effi-
ciency irrespective of maximization of consumer welfare. The
market incentive component is derived from the contractual na-
ture of patents.3' That is, the inventor reveals the invention in re-
turn for the government's promise of a specified statutory monop-
oly on the production of the idea.39 Since competition is curtailed,
patent owners charge the highest price that the market can bear,
typically far exceeding the marginal cost.4 ° Presumably, the in-
creased cost covers the investor's past and future investments on
research and development. Consumers, in turn, associate the
higher cost for patented products with the privilege of using the
invention.41 Hence developed nations, particularly the United
States, believe that patent owners with valuable products will
market them and discourage government interference with pat-
ent monopolies.42 Thus, compulsory licenses and price control
mechanisms are viewed as disincentives to inventors and patent
holders.4 Generally, the United States does not favor restricting
37. Comment, Theft of Trade Secrets: The Need for a Statutory Solution, 120 U. PA. L.
REV. 378, 400 (1972); see also Cole M. Fauver, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United
States: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 666, 674-76, 681 (1998)
(discussing why the United States views compulsory licenses as unnecessary).
38. See Fauver, supra note 37, at 680-81.
39. Id. at 681.
40. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law,
75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1065-66 (1997) (noting that "producers will price at marginal cost
only if they are forced to by the existence of competition. A producer who controls a market
will cut output and raise prices, increasing its profits but reducing both consumer and ag-
gregate social welfare"); see also Griffin, supra note 30, at 369.
41. See Lemley, supra note 40, at 996 (discussing the privilege issue).
42. See id; see also Fauver, supra note 38, at 677-78. Scholars have argued that com-
pulsory licenses are unconstitutional since the grant of the exclusive patent right is un-
conditional. Id. at 678. Others have compared compulsory licenses to government appro-
priation under the takings jurisdiction, implying that patent rights cannot be restricted by
compulsory licenses without just compensation. Id.
43. See Joseph A. Yosick, Compulsory Patent Licensing for Efficient Use of Inventions,
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1275, 1291-92 (2001). For an example ofjudicial treatment of compul-
sory licensing, see Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405
(1908), where the Court outlined the traditional American posture on compulsory licens-
ing. In considering whether the rights of a patent owner included the right not to put his
inventions to manufacturing use, the Court recognized that exclusivity characterizes the
absoluteness of the inventor's property rights. Id. at 424. The patent in question, the Lid-
dell patent, related to a paper bag machine. Id. at 406. After the patent was issued in
1896, the owner neither manufactured nor licensed the patent. Id. at 408. In 1908, the
patent owner sued the defendant for infringement for manufacturing the patent. Id. at
406. The defendant alleged that the owner of an unused patent was limited in law from
alleging infringement. Id. at 428.
[Vol. 38:777
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patent rights, despite a few judicial opinions to the contrary.4 4 If
an invention corresponds to basic necessities, such as pharmaceu-
ticals, the United States uses mechanisms like Medicaid and
Medicare to provide marginalized people with access to patents of
which they would otherwise be deprived. The question, discussed
in Part IV, is whether developed nations themselves would re-
spond differently to a deterioration of economic circumstances af-
fecting the government's ability to aid the marginalized or to
market distortions caused by the presence of monopolies. 5
Unlike the emphasis by developed nations on inventor incen-
tives, developing nations emphasize the public accessibility of the
invention.4 ' The low per capita income in developing nations af-
fects the government's ability to fulfill basic requirements and
thus increases the probability of occurrence of health exigencies.
Given the higher population and illiteracy rates, nations with low
per capita income prioritize increased consumer maximization,
especially for products catering to basic requirements. 7 Hence,
traditionally, developing nations exercise price control, especially
on pharmaceutical products, to ensure medication to the needy.48
44. For example, the dissent of District Judge Aldrich, sitting on a panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, from which the Paper Bag case was appealed
to the Supreme Court of the United States, favored restricting patent rights on the
grounds that non-use of patents for private benefits discouraged inventive activity. See
150 F. 741, 744-45 (1st Cir. 1906) (Aldrich, J., dissenting). Judge Aldrich stated that pat-
ents were meant to encourage invention by "protect[ing] the right to make, use, and vend"
the product in public interest. Id. at 745 (Aldrich, J., dissenting). Hence, he opined that
the court should discourage activities hindering the objective by preventing the patent
owner from alleging infringement. Id. (Aldrich, J., dissenting). In not restricting the pat-
ent owner's right, Judge Aldrich felt that the court of equity helped the patent owner to
accomplish non-use for private gain and thus contravened the spirit of equity and public
policy. Id. at 745, 757 (Aldrich, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas recaptured the substance of
Judge Aldrich's opinion in Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 380-384 (1945)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas argued that the Court should interfere where
patent owners misuse patents since patents are constitutionally conditioned on public
purposes. Id. at 383-84 (Douglas, J., dissenting). For further arguments against compul-
sory licensing, see Fauver, supra note 38, at 674-78.
45. See Simone A. Rose, On Purple Pills, Stem Cells and Other Market Failures: A
Case for a Limited Compulsory Licensing Scheme for Patent Property, 5-10 (unpublished
paper) (on file at Wake Forest Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Re-
search Paper No. 03-07, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=395421 (last visited
Mar. 31, 2004) (discussing how patent rights, affected by the market distortions, lead to
monopolistic markets); see also infra Part IV.
46. See Ragavan, supra note 36, at 184.
47. See id. at 137.
48. See id. at 133-34 (discussing price control measures taken by the government of
India).
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Thus, IP rights are balanced with consumer welfare. In a global
sense, this is the balance between trade and welfare.
In theory, the price of a patented product cannot be controlled
unless licensed compulsorily. Third-world governments, however,
control the prices of not the patented pharmaceutical products,
but the generic versions of the patented products, without com-
pulsorily licensing the patent itself.49 "Generic drugs," in the con-
text of developing nations, refers to copies of the patented phar-
maceuticals made using a process different from the patented
process and marketed at a lesser cost during the patent term.50
The issue of whether using a new process in the attempt to copy a
patent amounts to an innovation or an illegal activity is not com-
pletely resolved.51 Apart from the issue of innovation, third-world
governments directly control the prices of the generic drugs. For
example, India has an overall Drug Price Control Order 2 and
Brazil manufactures generic medication to treat Auto Immune
Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS").53 Price control increases the af-
fordability of medication while assuring the manufacturer a lim-
ited percentage of profits.54
Since generic versions of all patented medications cannot be
made readily available, developing nations prefer to statutorily
49. See, e.g., id. at 159-60.
50. See Griffin, supra note 30, at 400 n.253.
51. See Srividhya Ragavan, A 'Patent' Restriction on R & D, 2004 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL'Y (forthcoming 2004) (arguing that in limited cases the so-called 'copycat' drugs may
actually be 'inventions'); see also Pfizer Inc. v. Dr. Reddy's Laboratories Inc., Nos. 03-1227,
03-1258, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 3784 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 27, 2004). Dr. Reddy's used a novel
approach to make a generic compound of Norvasc. Id. at *11. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that it infringed on Pfizer's patent on Norvasc. Id. at
*13-14.
52. See Ragavan, supra note 36, at 133-35 (discussing India's Drug Price Control Or-
der and its effects on the pharmaceutical industry). The Drug Price Control Order facili-
tated price control by compartmentalizing drugs into different categories. See Suresh Ko-
shy, Note, The Effect of TRIPS on Indian Patent Law: A Pharmaceutical Industry
Perspective, 1 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 4, para. 26 (1995) (listing 21 Category I drugs and
122 Category II drugs). It specified a maximum allowable post-manufacturing expense for
each category. Id. For example, Category I consists of drugs for the National Health Pro-
gram and Category II encompasses drugs for health needs. Id. The "Maximum Allowable
Post-Manufacturing Expense" for price control in Category I is 75% and Category II is
100%. Id. The post-manufacturing expenses include advertising and distribution costs. Id.
A National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority reviews pharmaceuticals under price control
and monitors prices of decontrolled pharmaceuticals. Id. at para. 27.
53. See Ragavan, supra note 36, at 135-37. Brazil locally manufactures generic ver-
sions of the AIDS medication at 70% below market price to treat 100,000 low-income pa-
tients each year. Id. at 136.
54. See Koshy, supra note 52, Rule 3.4 paras. 25, 27.
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retain the right to compulsorily license, in order to maintain ade-
quate supplies by local working of the invention.55 Facilitating
public accessibility to the invention is a preventative measure
meant to safeguard public health.56 India, for example, under the
Patent Act of 1970, retained the right to compulsorily license a
patent if it was not reasonably priced or manufactured locally.
7
Within developing countries, local manufacturing is cost effective
and allows governments to exercise price control.55 Similar to In-
dia, other developing nations like Brazil, Thailand, and South Af-
rica also prefer to retain compulsory licensing rights. 9 Typically,
the right retained by the developing nation does not affect the in-
ventor's incentives to the point of deterring research and innova-
tion.6 °
International conventions generally endorse balancing patent
rights for limited reasons. For example, the 1967 Paris Conven-
tion allows the compulsory licensing of patents not worked by the
patentee for "four years from the date of application, or three
years from the member's grant of the patent."' Article 31 of
55. See Ragavan, supra note 36, at 136 (explaining the ways in which compulsory li-
censing has benefited Brazil).
56. See Fauver, supra note 37, at 668-70 (discussing the "adequate supply" theory).
57. Patents Act of 1970, 27 INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL 450, §§ 84(1), 90(c), 94 (2d ed. 1979).
Under the 1970 patent legislation, the government could compulsorily license a patent not
reasonably priced or not worked in a manner "satisfy[ing] the reasonable requirement of
the public." Ragavan, supra note 36, at 140. The reasonableness requirement of the public
is deemed not satisfied unless the invention is manufactured locally. See id.
58. See Ragavan, supra note 36, at 136 (discussing the cost-effectiveness of Brazil's
local manufacturing).
59. See id. at 172-74. See generally Baca, supra note 26, at 189, 196-204 (discussing
Mexico's compulsory licensing system).
60. Ragavan, supra note 36, at 134-35. Inventive activity tends to be lower in develop-
ing nations due to other factors like low per capita income, lack of education, and high il-
literacy rates. Id. at 137. Similarly, developing nations rarely use the compulsory licensing
provisions to further parallel importation, although this is a legitimate concern of the
pharmaceutical industry. See infra Part VI for a discussion of parallel importation.
61. Marc, supra note 6, at 112. The Convention seeks "to prevent the abuses which
might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example,
failure to work." Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 5A(2), 21 U.S.T. at 1636-37, 828
U.N.T.S. at 321. The origin of article 5A(2) can be traced to 1873, when the parties to the
Vienna Congress resolved that compulsory licenses should be made available if warranted
by "public interest." See Michael Halewood, Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working Re-
quirements and Compulsory Licenses at International Law, 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 243,
266 (1997). The Vienna Congress culminated into the Paris Convention in 1883. Id. Al-
though the Vienna Congress produced no binding legal instrument, in 1877, the provision
was adopted into the German law. Id. Article 5A(2) of the Paris Convention details that
"failure to work the patent could not result in forfeiture unless compulsory licensing was
an inefficient remedy. Therefore, compulsory licensing replaced forfeiture as the favored
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TRIPS allows members to compulsorily license patent rights dur-
ing "a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme ur-
gency or in cases of public non-commercial use," subject to certain
restrictions meant to protect against abuses.62 TRIPS, however,
neither defines "national emergency" nor indicates, beyond gen-
eralization, circumstances likely to be construed as warranting
compulsory licensing by member states." Hence, member states
lack consensus on when compulsory licensing can be exercised
under TRIPS.64 Therefore, although TRIPS, in Article 31, pro-
vides for compulsory licensing,65 developing country parties have
found it difficult to justify any circumstance as warranting the
exercise of the right as detailed below.
III. OBJECTIONS
At a time when an epidemic infection could have been cur-
tailed, developed nations refused to interpret TRIPS as providing
the flexibility to tackle a public health crisis.66 The pressure on
developing nations singularly focused on amending compulsory
license provisions, ignoring the local effect of the amendments.67
Developing nations, then fighting mass public health disasters,
merely wanted to retain a right to tackle national public health
exigencies, as opposed to exercising the right of compulsory li-
censing." The global response, characterized by that of the devel-
remedy to deter abuse by the patentee." Marc, supra note 6, at 112. A compulsory licens-
ing provision was first incorporated into the Paris Convention in 1925 at the Revision Con-
ference at The Hague. Halewood, supra, at 266. Article 5 of the Hague Revision permitted
compulsory licensing of patents not worked locally. Id. at 266-67; see also Marc, supra
note 6, at 112.
62. TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 31(b). "[Tlhe scope and duration of such use shall be lim-
ited to the purpose for which it was authorized." Id. art. 31(c); see also Marc, supra note 6,
at 116. A patent can be compulsorily licensed provided the patentee rejects a request to
market the product under "reasonable commercial terms and conditions." TRIPS, supra
note 3, art. 31(b). The license should be terminated "if and when the circumstances which
led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur." Id. art. 31(g).
63. See Naomi A. Bass, Note, Implications of the TRIPS Agreement for Developing
Countries: Pharmaceutical Patent Laws in Brazil and South Africa in the 21st Century, 34
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 191, 199 (2002).
64. Id.
65. TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 31.
66. Bass, supra note 63, at 199-200.
67. See id. at 204-05 (discussing the difficulties of implementing TRIPS in developing
nations because of socioeconomic differences).
68. See Brook Baker, U.S. Post-Doha Conditions Can Kill, HEALTH GAP (Mar. 3,
2002), available at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2002-March/002740.html
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oped nations, discussed below, highlights two important issues.
First, the extent to which forcing developing nations to compro-
mise their national responsibilities, in fear of trade sanctions,
contributed to the epidemic increase in AIDS.69 Second, whether
TRIPS requires nations to prioritize international obligations
when faced with dire national responsibilities.
A. Public Health Crisis Within Developing Nations
1. South Africa: Setting the Stride
In 1996, South Africa requested that the United States provide
access to drugs at a reduced cost to tackle AIDS.7" The matter
was treated as routine non-compliance with TRIPS, and South
Africa was asked to comply with TRIPS immediately or face trade
sanctions.71 The United States considered neither how a country
requesting cost reduction to access drugs could afford expensive
pharmaceuticals, nor that AIDS would assume epidemic propor-
tions unless appropriately curtailed.
Fearing the economic consequences of a trade sanction, South
Africa passed the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act
of 1997 ("Medicines Act").72 The Medicines Act included sections
15 and 22, which, taking into account the deteriorating public
health, allowed the health minister to import generic drugs, or
compulsorily license patents under the limited exigency of a na-
tional emergency. 73 The United States condemned the health
minister's "sweeping authority to abrogate patent rights for
(last visited April 4, 2004) (noting that it took South Africa three years and 400,000 lives
before President Clinton issued the Executive Order to validate the Medicines Act).
69. Transitioning towards the trade regime affected welfare in developing nations. See
generally Ruth Gana Okediji, Copyright and Public Welfare in Global Perspective, 7 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 117 (1999) (discussing similar issues with reference to copyrights).
70. See Ragavan, supra note 36, at 172; see also Helene Cooper et al., AIDS Epidemic
Traps Drug Firms in a Vise: Treatment vs. Profits, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2001, at Al (dis-
cussing the 1996 meeting between Jones Popovich, the American trade representative,
and AIDS activists on the South Africa issue).
71. See Ragavan, supra note 36, at 172-73.
72. See id. at 173; see also Bass, supra note 63, at 210. The 1997 legislation amended
the South African Medicines and Related Substances Control Act of 1965. See Marc, supra
note 6, at 116 n.85.
73. See Bass, supra note 63, at 210-11; Marc, supra note 6, at 116-17.
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pharmaceuticals"74 and in 1998, denied South Africa preferential
treatment under the generalized system of preference scheme
("GSP").76 Meanwhile, the July 1999 statistics established that
one in every five South Africans was infected with AIDS. 76 The
fear of trade sanctions precluded South Africa from characteriz-
ing the AIDS situation as a health crisis or as a national emer-
gency.7 7 Defensive for having continuously promoted trade poli-
cies in a country where survival was the central question, the
United States amended its policy to provide access to HIV/AIDS
medicines.7"
74. See Bass, supra note 63, at 212 (quoting Gary G. Yerkey, USTR Says South Africa
Agrees to Provide WTO-Consistent Patent Protection for Drugs, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
1541, 1541 (Sept. 22, 1999)).
75. Ragavan, supra note 36, at 173; see H.R. 4328, 105th Cong. (1998), enacted as Pub.
L. No. 105-277, at 155 ("[Nlone of the funds appropriated under this heading may be made
available for assistance for the central Government of the Republic of South Africa, until
the Secretary of State reports in writing to the appropriate committees of the Congress on
the steps being taken by the United States Government to work with the Government of
the Republic of South Africa to negotiate the repeal, suspension, or termination of section
15(c) of South Africa's Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act No. 90
of 1997"). Pretoria had requested additional benefits under the generalized system of pref-
erence scheme. The scheme allows poor countries to export products to the United States
at reduced duties. Id.; see Marc, supra note 6, at 119-21. Meanwhile, the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association of South Africa ("PMA") filed a suit against the South African
government to suspend the Medicine Act. The PMA is the organization in South Africa
representing pharmaceutical manufacturers in developed nations. In response, the South
African government passed the Medicines and Medical Devices Regulatory Act of 1998,
but the health crisis forced the government to retain controversial sections 15 and 22 of
the Medicines Act. See Marc, supra note 6, at 117. The South African Medicines and Medi-
cal Devices Regulatory Act (SAMMDRA) repealed the Medicines Act and therefore the suit
filed by the PMA focused on repealing SAMMDRA. See id. at 119.
76. The southern portion of Africa accounted for approximately twenty-five million, or
roughly 70%, of the world's HIV infected patients. See INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY INSTITUTE, PATENT PROTECTION AND ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS PHARMACEUTICALS
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 4 (2000), available at http://www.iipi.org/activities/Research/
HIV%20AIDS%2OReport.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2004). In seven countries in southern
Africa, 20% of the adults were infected with HIV. Id. Botswana accounted for the highest
percentage of the disease with 35.8% infected adults. Id. For additional information and
statistics, see, e.g., John Vidal, The Stakes Could Not Be Higher, GUARDIAN, Nov. 23, 2003,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/aids/story/0,7369, 1092957,00.html (last visited
Mar. 31, 2004). For a discussion of South Africa's AIDS problem, see Ford, supra note 11,
at 950-51.
77. See Bass, supra note 63, at 212.
78. Exec. Order No. 13,155, 3 C.F.R. 268-70 (2000). The Order prohibits the U.S. gov-
ernment from taking any "action pursuant to section 301(b) of the Trade Act of 1974 with
respect to any law or policy in beneficiary sub-Saharan African countries that promotes
access to HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals or medical technologies and that provides adequate
and effective intellectual property protection consistent with the TRIPS Agreement." Id;
see also Rosalyn S. Park, The International Drug Industry: What the Future Holds for
South Africa's HIVIAIDS Patients, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 125, 138 (2002). Following
the issuance of the executive order, five of the largest pharmaceutical companies agreed to
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2. Thailand: Another Stumbling Block
In 1989, Thailand was included on the United States' watch
list,79 owing to the 1979 Thai patent legislation which facilitated
the production of generic drugs.8" As proof of its intent to impose
trade sanctions, the United States moved Thailand to the status
of "priority foreign country"-a status generally imposed on coun-
tries grossly violating IP rights.8" Although by 1992 Thailand ex-
tended patent protection to pharmaceuticals, 2 the United States
expressed dissatisfaction with the compulsory licensing provi-
sions." Fearing economic retaliation, 4 Thailand abolished com-
pulsory licensing and the local working requirement."
The increase in drug prices resulting from the patent-friendly
amendments caused economically marginalized Thais to lose ac-
cess to medication. 6 The high cost of treatment was coupled with
the government's inability to fund medication. 7 When AIDS be-
drastically reduce prices on HIV/AIDS drugs for impoverished countries. Id. The forty
pharmaceutical multinational companies withdrew the suit previously filed through the
PMA against the government for challenging SAMMDRA. See Marc, supra note 6, at 120.
79. See Rosemary Sweeney, Comment, The U.S. Push for Worldwide Patent Protection
for Drugs Meets the AIDS Crisis in Thailand: A Devastating Collision, 9 PAC. RIM L. &
POL'Y J. 445, 460 (2000). The United States threatened to impose sanctions unless
amendments were introduced to the patent legislation before November 1989. Id.
80. Id. at 449.
81. Id. at 460.
82. See Stefan Kirchanski, Comment, Protection of U.S. Patent Rights in Developing
Countries: U.S. Efforts to Enforce Pharmaceutical Patents in Thailand, 16 Loy. L.A. INT'L
& CoMP. L.J. 569, 592 (1994).
83. See Sweeney, supra note 79, at 461. The amended Thai patent legislation retained
the authority to issue compulsory licenses of patented goods not locally manufactured. Id.
at 451. A Pharmaceutical Patents Board was created with power to compulsorily license
patents, control prices, and seek pricing and cost information of drugs. Id. at 451-52.
84. Id. at 461. In 1997, Thailand suffered a severe economic crisis, increasing the reli-
ance on American exports. Id. at 462. The United States was Thailand's largest export
market. Id. at 461.
85. See id. at 452. The amended Act also eliminated the local working requirement,
and thus the importation of patented products by the patentee was deemed as working the
patent locally. See Susannah Markandya, Timeline of Trade Disputes Involving Thailand
and Access to Medicines, at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/thailand/thailand.html (last
visited Mar. 31, 2004).
86. See Jiraporn Limpananont, U.S. Trade Pressure on Thailand (Drug Study Group,
Thailand), available at http://www.oxfamgb.orgleastasia/documents/Thaibullyingoct 2002.
doc (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
87. See Markandya, supra note 85, at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/thailand/thai
land.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2004) (stating that The Nation, a leading Thai newspaper,
reported that in 1999 "only 5% of AIDS patients [had] access to the combination use of two
major AIDS medications-AZT and ddI."); see also Sweeney, supra note 79, at 446. Within
ten years of reporting the first case of AIDS in 1994, Thailand housed a million people
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came the leading cause of death among Thais, the national re-
sponsibility of containing the disease became an international is-
sue.8 1 Consequently, despite asserting that compulsory licensing
was unnecessary, the American trade representative indicated
that "[ilf the Thai government determines that issuing a compul-
sory license is required to address its health care crisis, the U.S.
will raise no objection, provided the compulsory license is issued
in a manner fully consistent with the WTO TRIPS Agreement."89
3. Brazil: Marking the First Act of Rebellion
Brazil's amended patent legislation also incorporated compul-
sory licensing of patents not worked locally.9° The United States,
arguing that the local manufacturing requirement violated
TRIPS, requested that the dispute resolution panel of the WTO
review Brazil's amended patent law.91 Meanwhile, Brazil was
economically exhausted from spending $305 million annually on
its program to treat HIV-infected patients.92 Hence, Brazil
threatened to compulsorily license antiretroviral drugs when its
request to Roche Holding Ltd. to discount the price of drugs was
denied.93 The threat to compulsorily license patents, against the
with AIDS. By 2000, about 3% of the Thai population was reportedly infected with AIDS.
Id.
88. See Ruth Mayne & Michael Bailey, TRIPS and Public Health: The Next Battle,
OXFAM BRIEFING PAPER (Mar. 2002), available at http-//www.oxfam.org.uk/what-we-
do/issues/health/downloads/bpl5_trips.rtf (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
89. Markandya, supra note 85 (quoting a letter from Joseph Papovich, Assistant
United States Trade Representative, to Paisan Tan-Ud of PHA Network of Thailand) (Jan.
27, 2000)).
90. See Paul Champ & Amir Attaran, Patent Rights and Local Working Under the
WTO TRIPS Agreement: An Analysis of the U.S.-Brazil Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J. INTL L.
365, 385-86 (2002).
91. See Helene Cooper, U.S. Drops WTO Claim Against Brazilian Patent Law, WALL
ST. J., June 26, 2001, at B7.
92. Melody Petersen & Larry Rohter, Maker Agrees to Cut Price of 2 AIDS Drugs in
Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2001, at A4; see also Mario Osava, Government to Violate Pat-
ents on AIDS Drugs, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Aug. 23, 2001, available at httpj/www.aegis.
com/news/ips/2001/IP010808.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
93. See Miriam Jordan, Brazil To Break Roche Patent on AIDS Drug, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 23, 2001, at A3. Brazil requested Roche Holding Ltd. to reduce the cost of the AIDS
cocktail drug Viracept. Id. Roche Holding Ltd. refused to consider anything more than a
33% reduction in price. Id. Brazilian officials announced that the patent in Nelfinavir
would be compulsorily licensed for local manufacture of generic versions unless the price
was reduced. See Press Release, Brazilian Ministry of Health, Ministry of Health An-
nounces Compulsory Licensing of Nelfinavir Patent, (Aug. 22, 2001), at http://www.
cptech.org/ip/health/c/brazil/nelfO8222001.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
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background of the tremendous success of the Brazilian AIDS drug
distribution program, forced the United States to drop its claims
against Brazil in the WTO. 9'
B. Article 31: National Responsibility and International
Obligation
Despite the AIDS crisis, the European Union and the United
States were not interested in either diluting TRIPS or allowing
national governments the right to compulsorily license in emer-
gencies. 95 Developed nations reiterated that compulsory licensing
provisions under Article 31 should be read with Article 27.1.96
Developed nations were, however, willing to allow countries suf-
fering from an AIDS crisis compulsory licensing rights, provided
they were exercised in a manner fully consistent with TRIPS.
94. Cooper, supra note 91. The United States Trade Representative issued a state-
ment pledging cooperation to combat AIDS. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of State, Increasing
Access to Drugs to Fight HLV/AIDS and other Public Health Crises (June 24, 2002), at
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/11399.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2004). Consequently,
Roche and Merck reduced the cost of the AIDS drugs by 70% compared to the price paid by
U.S. buyers. Jennifer L. Rich, Roche Reaches Accord on Drug with Brazil, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 1, 2001, at C1 ("The new discount reduces the price of Viracept to about 30 percent of
what Roche charges in the United States."); see also Paulo Rebelo, Brazil Targets Another
AIDS Drug, WIRED NEWS, Aug. 29, 2001, available at http://www.wired.coml
news/politics/0,1283,46353,00.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2004). See generally Press Re-
lease, Roche Brazil, Roche Surprised by Authorities Declaration (Aug. 23, 2001), at
http://www.roche.com/med-corp-detail-2001?id=686 (last visited Mar. 31, 2004). Brazil
provided the AIDS "cocktail" medication free for its citizens and thus reduced the national
AIDS mortality rate from 10,592 in 1995 to 1,700 in 2001. Gustavo Capdevila & Mario
Osava, U.S. Drops Brazil Patents Case, Paves Way for Cheap Drugs, INTER PRESS SERVICE,
June 26, 2002, available at http://www.aegis.com/news/ips/2001/IP010624.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 31, 2004). To ensure supplies of the drugs to 100,000 HIV/AIDS patients, Brazil
manufactured seven of the twelve medications in a local company, Farminguinhos. Id.
95. See Cecilia Oh, US Opposed to Moves to Address Public-Health Concerns About
TRIPS, Third World Network (Nov. 1, 2002) at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/twrl31f.
htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2004); see also Cecilia Oh, Developing Countries Call for Action
on TRIPS at Doha WTO Ministerial Conference, Third World Network (Nov. 1, 2002) at
http://www.twnside.org.sgftitle/twrl31d.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
96. TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 27.1. TRIPS asserts that all products or processes should
be patented. Id. When read with Article 31, Article 27.1 will prevent compulsory licensing
as intervening over the rights vested on patents. See id. art. 27.1, 31. That is, using the
compulsory licensing provisions to secure essential drugs would violate Article 27.1. See
id.
97. See Exec. Order No. 13,155, 3 C.F.R. 268-70; see also supra notes 66-71 and ac-
companying text.
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The argument that compulsory licensing violates Article 27.1
contradicts the idea of a TRIPS-consistent licensing scheme.9" As-
suming compulsory licensing can be exercised in a manner fully
consistent with TRIPS, the developed nations' previous position
to remove all compulsory licensing provisions in the patent laws
of developing nations would violate TRIPS. This change in posi-
tion makes developed nations answerable as to why developing
nations were not given the option of a TRIPS-compliant compul-
sory license at a stage when the epidemic spread of AIDS could
have been prevented. The delay in recognizing the scope of the
AIDS epidemic contributed to the increase in the disease, thus
making TRIPS directly responsible, as discussed below.
The refusal to reduce the price of medication also included the
price of diagnostic kits, thus preventing early detection.99 There-
fore, some of the AIDS-infected, unaware of their condition, con-
tinued to spreads the infection. °° Detection at a later stage left
the infected with a sense of frustration against the government's
inability to provide adequate care, triggering irresponsible behav-
ior that further spreads the infection.' Moreover, "absent the
possibility of treatment, people have little incentive to learn
whether they have the virus or not."02 When neither medication
nor diagnosis was available, government initiative, in the form of
AIDS education, proved futile.0 3 AIDS experts note that, al-
though the AIDS medication merely treats the patients, the
treatment "actually help[s] prevention."'04 "When dying people
98. See TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 31(b).
99. Former President Clinton's foundation has recently negotiated with companies to
reduce the cost of AIDS diagnostic kits. See Celia W. Dugger, Clinton Gets Five Companies
to Reduce the Cost of AIDS Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2004, at All.
100. See Holly Burkhalter, The Politics of AIDS: Engaging Conservative Activists,
FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 9.
101. See Letter from Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Professor of Medical Anthropology, Uni-
versity of California at Berkeley, to Helen Epstein (Nov. 20, 2003) (published in N.Y. REV.
OF BOOKS, Nov. 20, 2003, at 57).
102. See Burkhalter, supra note 100, at 9.
103. See id.
104. Id.
Jim Kim, a senior official at the World Health Organization ("WHO") and one
of the world's leading AIDS experts, has noted that making treatment avail-
able would actually help prevention. He testified before the U.S. Senate that
even in Uganda, where prevention efforts have been among the most success-
ful in Africa, prevalence seems resistant to reduction below eight percent
when preventive approaches are used alone. Along with most other infectious
disease experts, therefore, he advocates comprehensive programs that inte-
grate prevention and treatment into a mutually supporting package.
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are restored to health before the eyes of the community, the am-
biguity, myths, and denial about the viral cause of AIDS deaths
are put to rest and treatment becomes the best educational tool
available."' ° The operation of TRIPS precluded AIDS treatment,
and thus AIDS prevention, in developing countries. 10 6
Had TRIPS not been an impediment, developing nations could
have negotiated arrangements with generic drug companies in
much the same way the United States and Canada did during the
anthrax crisis."' Developing nations could have used the money
saved from opting for generic drugs towards AIDS education,
thus curtailing the spread of the infection. Hence the operation of
TRIPS contributed directly to the spread of the AIDS infection.
Soon, becoming a signatory of TRIPS ceased to be a beneficial
commitment for developing nations when developed nations
forced national responsibilities to become a subset of interna-
tional obligations.'
The TRIPS language, however, does not necessarily require na-
tional responsibility to be subject to international obligations. Ar-
ticle 31 specifies that "[w]here the law of a Member allows for
other use of the subject matter of a patent without the authoriza-
tion of the right holder,"'0 9 any use, including that of the govern-
ment, "shall be considered on its individual merits."1 ' Each of the
countries discussed in the previous section suffered from health
exigencies warranting the exercise of Article 31.111 Moreover, Ar-
ticle 31(b) permits use of a patented product, provided the user
unsuccessfully attempted to "obtain authorization from the right
holder on reasonable commercial terms.""2 The affected countries
fulfilled this subsection by either directly approaching the United
States' trade office, as did South Africa, or the patent owner, as
did Brazil. Importantly, the affected nations fulfilled the re-
Id.
105. Scheper-Hughes, supra note 101, at 58.
106. See Ruth Moyne, U.S. Bullying on Drug Patents: One Year After Doha, Oxfam
Briefing Paper 4, Nov. 2002, available at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/whatwedo/issues/
health/downloads/bp33_bullying.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
107. See infra Part IV.
108. See generally Moyne, supra note 106, at 11 (noting that the actions of developed
nations limited access to cheaper medicines and thus run counter to the spirit of TRIPS).
109. See TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 31.
110. Id. art. 31(a).
111. See supra Part III.A.
112. TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 31(b).
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quirements of Article 31(b) despite the Article 31(b) language
stating that "[tihis requirement may be waived by a Member in
the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of ex-
treme urgency."
1 13
Article 31 also addresses the rightful concerns of developed na-
tions from parallel importation."' Developed nations reacted,
however, with a disregard for the sovereign national responsibili-
ties of other countries. 115 Moreover, after vehemently opposing
compulsory licensing and price controls at a time when an epi-
demic could have been prevented, in the wake of an AIDS crisis,
developed nations lacked alternate solutions to tackle the crisis."6
Consequently, as able-bodied people died from the infection due
to lack of treatment, the impoverished nations underwent a fur-
ther decline in economic productivity due to the AIDS virus."7
The increasing medical expenses furthered the decline in produc-
tivity."' Slowly, becoming a party to TRIPS ceased to be a mutu-
ally beneficial proposition-as contemplated under Article 7-for
developing nations. Thus, the economic and political advantage of
avoiding a public health crisis became imminent for developing
nations." 9
IV. REACTIONS
This part demonstrates how the developed nations, particularly
the United States, exercised the exact options it advised develop-
113. Id. The developing nations also fulfilled the other conditions in Article 31 being
local, non-exclusive use. See id.
114. See id. art. 31(f) ("[Any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply
of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use.").
115. See Leanne M. Fecteau, Note, The Ayahausca Patent Revocation: Raising Ques-
tions About Current U.S. Patent Policy, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 69, 81 (2001) (discuss-
ing how developing countries have been pressured into signing TRIPS by developed coun-
tries).
116. See infra Part IV (arguing that during the anthrax crisis the developed nations
came up with no novel or alternate solution except what the developing countries were
practicing).
117. LoRi BOLLINGER & JOHN STOVER, THE POLICY PROJECT, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L
DEV., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AIDS IN SOUTH AFRICA 3 (1999).
118. See id.
119. Highlighting the economic and social challenges from poverty and public health
issues, developing nations sought a broad and balanced program along the lines of Article
31 within TRIPS. See Helene Cooper & Geoff Winestock, Poor Nations Win Gains in
Global Trade Deal as U.S. Compromises, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2001, at Al (discussing is-
sues raised by the Indian Commerce and Industry Minister in the WTO session at Qatar);
see also Doha Declaration, supra note 25.
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ing countries against taking when faced with comparable issues,
albeit in a much smaller degree. The reactions of the United
States are examined in light of two circumstances-a slowing
economy and a threat of public health crisis.12 °
A. Economic Downturn
The economy in the United States slowed in 2001, resulting in
a deficit from tax revenues in several states. 121 Simultaneously,
the cost of the most frequently used prescription drugs rose at
four times the rate of inflation.122 The declining tax revenues left
states with the choice of either reducing the state funds for Medi-
caid or confronting the cost of drugs. 23 Owing to the economic
120. The political and economic changes refer to the economic downturn in the United
States after September 11, 2001, the anthrax crisis, and the Enron scandal. See generally
Rose, supra note 45, at 5 (discussing the need for compulsory licensing provisions in light
of September 11, 2001 and the anthrax crisis).
121. Russell Gold et al., States Square Off Against Drug Firms in Crusade on Prices,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2001, at Al; see also The Head Ignores the Feet, ECONOMIST, May 24,
2003, at 27. American states faced a budget shortfall of over $50 billion and an additional
$60-85 billion was required to balance the books. See Chopped Out, ECONOMIST, Jan. 25,
2003, at 30. In 2003, the revenue shortfall in states totaled up to $21.5 billion. See The
Head Ignores the Feet, supra, at 27. The sum of $21.5 billion represents a 23% increase
over what was a predicted shortfall in November. Id. For the fiscal year 2004, the pre-
dicted revenue shortfall was $80 billion affecting 10% of the expenditure in some states.
Id. at 28.
122. The rising prescription drug costs became a larger factor in the total health ex-
penditures of states, and led to an increase of 16%, or $142 billion, on prescription medica-
tion. Ron Winslow et al., States, Insurers Find Prescriptions for High Drug Costs, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 11, 2002, at Al (explaining that the total spending in the U.S on prescription
drugs accounts for 10% of American health care spending and that the rate of inflation for
prescription drug prices exceeded the rate of general inflation). See generally Whitney
Magee Phelps, Comment, Maine's Prescription Drug Plan: A Look into the Controversy, 65
ALB. L. REV. 243, 245 (2001) (reporting that total drug expenditures are expected to double
from 1999 to 2004).
The increasing drug prices, coupled with deteriorating economic conditions, contributed
to the prescription drug crisis. Between 1982 and 1988, prescription drug costs increased
at an average annual rate of 9.5%, more than any other component of the health care sec-
tor. "Between 1998 and 2000, Medicaid's average annual spending on prescription drugs
grew by 19.7%." Sarah Lueck, States Efforts To Cut Drug Prices Get Boost From Medicaid
Chief WALL ST. J., May 30, 2003, at Al; see also Sara M. Ford, Congressional Research
Service Report to Congress, Medicaid: Reimbursement for Outpatient Prescription Drug,
CRS-15 (Mar. 7, 1991). From 1980 to 1989, payments for Medicaid prescription drugs in-
creased 179%. Medicaid expenditures for all other services increased by only 134%. Id. But
see Phelps, supra, at 245 (discussing that PhRMA estimated that the increase in price in-
flation of drugs remained at a low 4.2% in 1999).
123. Ragavan, supra note 36, at 167-68; see also Miracle. On Ice, ECONOMIST, May 17,
2003, at 29 (stating that although in the past Minnesota consistently ranked among the
top in health care, education, and quality of life, a two-year deficit of $4.2 billion threatens
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slowdown, state governments sought what the federal govern-
ment advocated against in developing nations-balancing the
rights of manufacturers and consumers by interfering with the
market price of pharmaceuticals.124 Efforts were taken to reduce
state expenditures on prescription drugs without affecting acces-
sibility of drugs to the needy.'25 States restricted patents either by
using generic drugs,'26 or by indirectly influencing the price of
branded pharmaceuticals. 27 Both options targeted different
pharmaceutical cycles. The option of using generic drugs pro-
duced in developed nations quickened the post-patent entry of the
cost effective generics into the market. 28 The second option re-
duced the cost of patented Medicaid pharmaceuticals.'29 Together,
both options improved accessibility of the medication by providing
low-cost alternatives.
The emphasis of the state governments on providing access to
medication conflicted with developed nations' traditional advice
to third-world countries. The United States government has spe-
cifically opposed prioritizing accessibility to the needy and reiter-
ated that global trade interests far outweigh the local welfare ob-
ligations of providing medication to impoverished citizens.
1. Option 1: Generic Drugs
Generic drugs have the advantage of cost effectiveness in com-
parison with branded medication. 3 ° Within developed nations,
the term "generic drug" refers to copies of pharmaceutical patents
made and marketed at a lesser cost after the expiration of the
the state's programs).
124. See Ragavan, supra note 36, at 168.
125. See id.
126. See infra Part IV.A.1.
127. See infra Part IV.A.2.
128. See infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text
129. See infra note 140-41 and accompanying text.
130. Generic Pharmaceutical Access and Choice for Consumers Act of 2003, S. 51,
108th Cong. § 2 (2003). In general, "generic pharmaceuticals cost between 25 percent and
60 percent less than brand-name pharmaceuticals, resulting in an estimated average sav-
ings of $15 to $30 on each prescription filled." Id. § 2(a)(3)(B). "Independent studies have
estimated that generics provide an average savings of $45.50 for each prescription drug
sold." Id. § 2(a)(4). For example, the same quantity of anxiety drugs costs $133.98 for
ninety tablets of the branded Xanax while ninety tablets of the generic Alprazolam costs
$10.97. See Drugstore.corn Website: Drug Prices and Information, at www.drugstore.com/
pharmacy (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
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patent period.'31 The entry of generic drugs into the market after
the patent term is typically delayed due to several factors like
bio-equivalency testing, approval by the Food and Drug Admini-
stration ("FDA"), and others. 32 Patent holders generally com-
pound the delay using various tactics, in effect extending market
exclusivity beyond the patent term.
133
The Hatch-Waxman Act of 198413 represents the congressional
initiative to balance the rights of patent holders with the public's
need for the medication135 by reducing the post-patent market ex-
clusivity period for pharmaceuticals.'36 In 1984, the effect of dete-
riorating economic conditions on employment and income ele-
vated the health care interests of the public above the pecuniary
131. The term "generic drugs" does not refer to the third-world generics. See Griffin,
supra note 30, at 400 n.23; see also S. 51, 108th Cong. § 2(a)(1) (2003) (stating that generic
pharmaceuticals must be approved by the Food and Drug Administration).
132. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000), which was enacted in 1984 by Congress to reduce
undue delay from bio-equivalency testing and to introduce the public to new products at
competitive prices after the expiration of the patents; see also Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar
Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 864-65 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
133. See, for example, Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2001), where the issue concerned not the actual patent, but a metabolite produced in vivo
after the drug was swallowed. Id. at 1328. Nevertheless, it delayed the introduction of the
generic drug. See id. Similarly, obtaining add-on patents unrelated to the actual compound
delays the introduction of generic drugs.
134. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 355 (2000)).
135. Amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act were enacted after intense lobbying from
the generic drug industry. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000); see also Intermedics, Inc. v.
Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp 1269, 1272-73 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
136. See generally Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimen-
tal Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV.
1, 22 (2001) (discussing Roche, 733 F.2d. at 858). Roche resulted in the enactment of the
Hatch-Waxman Act, which introduced § 271(e) to the Patent Act, id., allowing the use of a
patented invention solely for gathering data to support a Federal Drug Administration
(FDA) application for generic versions of previously approved drugs. See 35 U.S.C. §
271(e)(1) (1994). However, the generic drug industry has been concerned that pharmaceu-
tical companies have blocked competition for much longer by filing additional patent
claims and seeking injunctions on various grounds. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. American Cy-
anamid Co., 82 F.3d 1568, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (applying the process patent amendment
in § 271(g) to intermediates); see also Chris Adams & Greg Hitt, Bush Deals Blow to Big
Drug Makers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2002, at A3; Robert Pear, Bush Seeks Faster Generic
Drug Approval, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2002, at A24. The 2003 amendment provides for the
FDA to enact complimenting rules limiting the challenges available for pharmaceutical
companies to delay or block the sale of generic drugs. These rules will not require congres-
sional approval and would take effect in 2004. See FDA WHITE PAPER: NEW FDA
INITIATIVE ON "IMPROVING ACCESS TO GENERIC DRUGS," (June 12, 2003), at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/generics/whitepaper.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2004); see
also Amy Goldstein, Bush Plan to Increase Generic Drugs Draws Flak, WASH. POST, Oct.
22, 2002, at A6.
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interests of the patent holders-a measure uniformly reflected in
all price control legislation of developing nations. Ironically, Arti-
cle 31 provides for the same balance by allowing members to take
appropriate measures in the event of a national emergency. 13 7
The deterioration of economic conditions in 2002 resulted in the
Senate complementing the Hatch-Waxman Act by approving a
bill limiting regulatory delays of generic drug applications.138 The
bill quickened the market entry of generics in the post-patent pe-
riod by "penaliz[ing] companies that reach agreements with mak-
ers of brand-name drugs to delay the introduction of generic ver-
sions." 39
2. Option 2: Influencing the Market Price of Prescription Drugs
Under the second option, state programs reduced prices of
pharmaceuticals catering to Medicaid customers by indirectly
compelling companies to offer discounts.14 ° In each of the pro-
grams discussed below, government initiatives obstructed the
patent from realizing full market potential. As in developing
countries, the government balanced the patent holder's and the
patient's interests. Unlike developing nations where market price
is directly restricted to a percentage of the cost of production, the
state governments indirectly reduced a percentage of the market
price. That it amounts to a price control is evidenced by the affi-
davits of drug manufacturers describing how the state programs
sharply reduced the market share of drugs."'
137. See TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 31(b).
138. See Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act of 2003, S. 54, 108th Cong.
(2003) [hereinafter Greater Access Act]. The use of generic pharmaceuticals for brand-
name pharmaceuticals could save purchasers of pharmaceuticals between 8 and 10 billion
dollars per annum. Id. at § 2(a)(6)(A); see also Drug Competition Act of 2003, S. 946, 108th
Cong. (2003) (detailing the provision for timely notice to the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission regarding agreements between companies with patent rights
concerning manufacturing generic versions of branded drugs); Leila Abboud, Bush Acts to
Speed Generics to Market, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2003, at A3. See generally Gardiner Har-
ris, Bush to Back Measures on Generic Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2003, at C1.
139. Harris, supra note 138, at C1.
140. See Russell Gold, Minnesota Sues Pharmacia Over Drug Pricing, WALL ST. J.,
June 19, 2002, at D3 (stating that state budgets had the maximum expenditure for Medi-
caid to residents without drug coverage).
141. For example, SmithKline claimed that the program in Nevada reduced the market
share of four of their drugs. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1864.
Within six months of the Medicaid amendment, the market share of Augmentin (used to
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a. The Maine Experiment
The State of Maine passed the Fairer Pricing for Prescription
Drugs Act of 2000, which created the "Maine Rx Plus Program"
("Rx Plus Program"). The Rx Plus Program dealt with pharma-
ceutical drug pricing and profits-terms, incidentally, used in
several third-world nations to refer to price control. 43 The Rx
Plus Program allowed Maine's uninsured citizens to cope with
prescription drug prices by negotiating a discounted rebate with
the pharmaceutical manufacturers.'" Under the Rx Plus Pro-
gram, names of manufacturers who did not "voluntarily" enter
into rebate agreements with the Commissioner of Maine Care-
the state Medicaid administrator-were released to health care
providers and the public. 4 ' Sales made by noncompliant manu-
facturers were subject to the prior authorization requirements of
Maine Care. 146 The procedural burdens imposed by the prior au-
thorization requirement shifted patient and physician loyalty to
competing drugs of manufacturers not subject to the authoriza-
tion.4 v Thus, Maine indirectly influenced the market price of
pharmaceuticals by prevailing on drug manufacturers' need to re-
tain customers. 48
treat bacterial infections) declined from 49% to 18%. Id.
142. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 2681 (West. Supp. 2003).
143. The Rx Plus Program prohibited manufacturers from "profiteering" by charging
unreasonable prices for prescription drugs or from refusing to sell prescription drugs. Id. §
2697(2). The statute prohibited a manufacturer from demanding an "unconscionable price"
or "[e]xact[ing] or demand[ing] prices or terms that lead to any unjust or unreasonable
profit" as "illegal profiteering." Id. Violating the provision by profiteering resulted in civil
damages, including punitive damages. Id. § 2697(3). The Attorney General had the power
to investigate any suspected violations. Id. § 2698. The provision was found to be unconsti-
tutional by the United States District Court for the District of Maine, and Maine did not
appeal this issue to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. See Pharm.
Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 72 n.2 (1st. Cir. 2001), cert granted,
536 U.S. 956 (June 28, 2002) (No. 01-188).
144. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681(4) (West. Supp. 2003). The Rx Plus Program
protected residents without a prescription drug plan. All residents of Maine, who met in-
come and drug expenditure requirements, were eligible to enroll. Id. § 2681(2)(F). Enrol-
lees purchased discounted prescription drugs from participating Maine pharmacies. Id. §
2681(5). The discounts of the pharmacies were reimbursed from a state-established fund
consisting of "rebate payments" collected from participating drug manufacturers. Id. §
2681(9).
145. Id. § 2681(7).
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., Concannon, 249 F.3d at 77.
148. See, e.g., Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, No. 00-157-B-H, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *4 (D. Me. Oct. 26, 2000).
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The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
("PhRMA") moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Maine
from enforcing the Rx Plus Program.'49 On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the Rx Plus
Program as consistent with the congressional intent to provide
medical services to those with insufficient resources in "the best
interests of the recipients."15 ° The court added that state law was
not preempted since the substantial local benefit outweighed any
effect on interstate commerce. 1 ' PhRMA argued that although
voluntary, the Maine program would result in a loss of profits the
manufacturer would otherwise gain from distributors.152 The
First Circuit maintained that the effect on prices was inconse-
quential so long as manufacturers were not directly required to
sell their drugs to a wholesaler for a certain price.'53 In vacating
the district court injunction, the First Circuit exhibited no disdain
toward price controls under limited conditions, and favored the
indirect rather than direct form of controlling prices of pharma-
ceuticals.154
149. Id. at *11. The district court held that the Rx Plus Program violated the commerce
clause by regulating sales of out-of-state manufacturers and distributors. Id. at *14. The
court construed that sales to in-state distributors are implicitly preempted by the federal
Medicaid program, id. at *20, and granted a preliminary injunction against implementing
the Rx Plus Program. Id. at *24. The court added that the Maine legislation extended the
Congressional intent by altering the federal Medicaid program. Id. at *20.
150. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 75. The court noted that there was no express, implied, or
field preemption and, therefore, addressed the issue of implied conflict preemption. Id. at
74-75 & n.6.
151. See id. at 84. The court considered whether the Maine amendments had an ex-
press extraterritorial reach affecting interstate commerce and held that the out-of-state
transaction is not regulated since the rebate program is voluntary. Id. at 82. Using the
Pike balancing test, the court held that "the local benefits appear[ed] to outweigh the bur-
den on interstate commerce." Id. at 84. The court maintained that the Rx Plus Program
addressed a legitimate state interest, since the harm to interstate commerce alleged by
PhRMA would be the same regardless of whether manufacturer compliance is completely
voluntary or a product of coercion through the Rx Plus Program. See id. at 82.
152. Id.
153. See id. In addressing the issue of what would happen if all states followed the
Maine program, the court noted that it would result in a loss of profits for the manufac-
turers, but indicated that the effect on interstate commerce, along with the benefits to the
recipients, far outweighed the loss to the pharmaceutical companies. Id. at 82-84.
154. See id. at 81-82. An intervention petition filed by a shareholder specifically ar-
gued that the Maine program conflicted with the federal patent law by controlling prices
and conditions for the sale of patented prescription drugs. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of
Am. v. Comm'r, 201 F.R.D. 12, 14 (D. Me. 2001). The district court denial of the motion to
intervene was confirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Schinder, 25 Fed. Appx. 865, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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b. Florida's Price Influencing Amendments
In 2001, the State of Florida's amendments excluded drugs
produced by manufacturers not providing a 10% discount from
the preferred list of the Florida Medicaid program. 5 Drugs ex-
cluded from the preferred list, if prescribed to Medicaid benefici-
aries, were subject to prior approval from the pharmacist.15 By
advising physicians on cheaper alternatives, the approval proce-
dure pressured pharmaceutical companies into being on the pre-
ferred list by providing the government-specified discount.157
PhRMA sought a preliminary injunction on the basis that the
amendments were preempted by section 1927(d)(4) of the federal
Social Security Act ("SSA"). 15  The SSA mandates that states offer
all federally approved prescription drugs to Medicaid beneficiar-
ies."' 9 PhRMA argued that unless there is a written finding that a
specified drug offers no clinically meaningful benefit, Medicaid
beneficiaries should not be denied prescription drugs on other
grounds. 6 ° The district court considered the loss of market share
of drugs-not on the preferred list but subject to prior authoriza-
155. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 409.91195(A), 409.912(40)(a)(7) (2003). In 2001, drug com-
panies filed a case challenging the Florida Progam. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v.
Medows, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1186 (N.D. Fla. 2001).
156. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.91195(8) (2003).
157. See Pharmaceutical Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Meadows, 304 F.3d 1197, 1208 n.9
(11th Cir. 2002). Only 821 out of the 1,876 branded drugs were present in Florida's pre-
ferred list. See Conrad F. Meier, PhRMA Asserts Itself in Court Action, HEALTH CARE
NEWS, Oct. 2001, at 2. Because manufacturers refused to enter into such agreements, 50%
of the branded drugs in the Medicaid program were not on the preferred list. Medows, 184
F. Supp. 2d at 1189.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d) (2000) [hereinafter SSA]; Medows, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 1186.
159. Medows, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 1189; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(a)(1). The Medicaid
program was enacted by Congress in 1965 under Title XIX of the SSA. 42 U.S. § 1396r-
8(a)(1); Medows, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 1188. The program is a joint venture between the fed-
eral government and each state. Medows, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 1188. The federal govern-
ment pays about 56% of the cost in the respective states while the states pay the rest of
the expenses. Id. The Medicaid program directly reimburses pharmacists for drugs that
they provide to Medicaid beneficiaries. Id. The pharmaceutical manufacturers sell pre-
scription drugs in states through the Medicaid program. Id. The SSA requires pharmaceu-
tical companies to charge the same price to state .and preferred customers for Medicaid
supplies. Ragavan, supra note 36, at 168. The price is discounted as a part of the agree-
ment negotiated by the drug companies for Medicaid supplies. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(a)(1). In
Florida, manufacturers offered the required discount of 15.1% with limited exceptions.
Medows, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 1189. The amendment restricted manufacturers not under the
agreement from marketing their drugs to Medicaid beneficiaries. Id.
160. Id.
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tion-irrelevant."6' On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit concurred and validated the economic
criterion of the approval program, which forms the crux of the in-
direct price reduction.'62
Meanwhile, other states, including Illinois, North Carolina,
Oregon, and Hawaii, copied the Maine and Florida Medicaid pro-
grams.'63 Encouraged by the success of inducing indirect rebates
for the Medicaid drugs, other states (e.g., Michigan), sought re-
bates for non-Medicaid drugs, as discussed below.
161. Id. at 1196 ("The federal law does not purport to guarantee a market share. It only
requires that a State Medicaid program make available all of the drugs on the federal
drug formulary."). The court found no conflict between the federal and the state law since
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d)(4) authorized the establishment of a prior authorization require-
ment subject to conditions. Id. The condition was that no drug should be excluded from the
federal drug formulary. Id. The court concluded that the Florida program did not exclude
the formulary since it adopts the federal drug formulary and adds a prior authorization
component. Id. at 1197.
162. Meadows, 304 F.3d at 1208. PhRMA argued that under the federal law, clinical
factors are the only permissible criteria for excluding a drug from the formulary. Id. at
1207; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d)(4)(C) ("A covered outpatient drug may be ex-
cluded.., only if... the excluded drug does not have a significant, clinically meaningful
therapeutic advantage in terms of safety, effectiveness, or clinical outcome of such treat-
ment for such population over other drugs included in the formulary and there is a written
explanation (available to the public) of the basis for the exclusion."). In addressing
whether the decision to remove a drug from a § 1396r-8(d)(4) formulary must be based
solely on clinical factors, the court specifically mentioned that the prior approval require-
ment included an economic factor. Meadows, 304 F.3d at 1208. It gave substantial defer-
ence to the administering agency within the state, however, in deciding that coverage
would presumably be based on medical information conveyed by the prescribing doctor to
the state agency that administers the Medicaid program. Id. Hence, although it included
an economic criterion, the court concluded that the decision was based on clinical factors.
Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Florida
law does not deny coverage of Medicaid-eligible drugs since the program does not exclude
any Medicaid-eligible outpatient drugs from coverage. The court noted that there was "no
reason to believe that a prescribing physician would compromise the medical care of his
patient in order to avoid making a telephone call to obtain a twelve-month authorization
of medication not on the preferred drug list." Id. at 1207 n.8. The Eleventh Circuit con-
cluded, therefore, that the Florida amendment does not exclude any drugs from the list.
See id. The court affirmed that there was no implied conflict preemption of the federal law
since the Florida program had the potential to provide better medical services and hence
was not an obstacle to the Congressional objectives. Id. at 1209. Soon Florida increased
the prerequisite discount rate for the preferred list by an additional 6%. Ragavan, supra
note 36, at 168.
163. Winslow et al., supra note 122, at Al. For example, Oregon supplied doctors and
consumers with information on cost and effectiveness of alternative generic drugs. Id.
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c. Michigan's Program for Rebates on Non-Medicaid Drugs
Michigan set a low common denominator for all drug prices by
instituting the Best Practices Initiative ("Initiative")."M The Ini-
tiative identified drugs bearing negotiated rebates as "best in
class."'65 Drugs not so identified were subject to the prior authori-
zation requirement.'66 Manufacturers could avoid the prior au-
thorization procedure by entering into two agreements with the
State of Michigan." 7 The first agreement required the manufac-
turer to match the price of the lowest priced "best in class" drug
in the "relevant therapeutic class."16 The second agreement re-
quired the manufacturer to discount prices of certain non-
Medicaid drugs.'69
Instead of challenging the validity of the program, PhRMA
challenged the authority of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services ("Secretary") to approve the Michigan program in Phar-
maceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v. Thomp-
son. '7 With reference to the agreement on non-Medicaid drugs,
164. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson, 259 F. Supp. 2d 39, 45 (D.D.C.
2003); Winslow et al., supra note 122, at Al (discussing that Michigan also introduced a
program called "Generic Drugs: The Unadvertised Brand," and allowed health insurers to
promote wider use of generics); see also Gold et al., supra note 121, at Al.
165. See Thompson, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 45.
166. See id. at 46.
167. See id.
168. See id. This agreement is termed the "Supplemental Drug Rebate Agreement" be-
cause the rebate is above the discount that a manufacturer is required to provide under
the SSA. See id.
169. See id. This agreement is termed the "Non-Medicaid Agreement." See id.
170. 259 F. Supp. 2d 39, 47 (D.D.C. 2003). The Medicaid program created under the
SSA requires the Secretary to approve the state Medicaid program. See id. at 46. PhRMA
questioned the Secretary's authority to approve the state programs alleging that the Sec-
retary acted arbitrarily in approving the state Medicaid programs and thus violated the
Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2000); Thompson, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 61.
PhRMA alleged that the Secretary acted arbitrarily, violating the SSA, the Commerce
Clause, and the Supremacy Clause. See Thompson, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 44. In Pharmaceuti-
cal Research and Manufacturers of America v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.
2001), rev'd, 251 F.3d 219 (D.C. Cir. 2001), PhRMA argued that under the SSA, manufac-
turers paid rebates only on drugs "for which payment [was] made under the State [Medi-
caid] plan." Id. at 4. The Thompson court rejected PhRMA's argument and held that under
the SSA, the Supplemental Rebate Agreement should be construed as an addition to the
rebate program. See Thompson, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 68. The court explained that under the
state Medicaid plans, pharmacies would charge the new Medicaid beneficiaries discounted
prices for prescription drugs. PhRMA, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 5. The court stated that the price
for a prescription drug would equal the difference between the Medicaid price for a pre-
scription-the price the state has agreed to pay pharmacies for prescriptions filled under
Medicaid-and a fixed-percentage rebate initially set at 17.5% of that price. Id. at 6. The
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the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held
that "it was reasonable for the Secretary to conclude that the best
interests of the Medicaid program would be advanced, not im-
paired, by imposing a prior authorization requirement that would
preserve [the Non-Medicaid programs] and thus prevent diver-
sion of participants into Medicaid." 7' The court's ruling allowed
Michigan to influence pharmaceutical prices of both Medicaid and
non-Medicaid drugs.
Meanwhile, Vermont imitated the Florida and Maine programs
and saved more than $1.6 million in three months.'72 PhRMA
contended that the SSA required the Medicaid program to pay
the cost of medication under a "state plan."'73 Instead, the state
initiatives shifted the cost of funding the Medicaid programs to
the pharmaceutical companies, requiring them to cover 18% of
the cost of prescription drugs.'74 The district court rejected
PhRMA's suit against the federal government. 7 ' But the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld
PhRMA's argument holding that, barring Congressional ap-
proval, the SSA does not include manufacturers' rebates as part
of the state expenditure.'76 Hence, the appellate court decided
states would reimburse the pharmacy but would bill manufacturers quarterly to collect
the combined rebate amount. Thus, the respective states would eventually recoup their
advance when the rebate was refunded. Id. PhRMA contended that this would result in
.no state funds [being] expended." Id. Therefore, PhRMA argued, states could not require
the manufacturers to pay rebates on drugs dispensed unless the Secretary waived the
statutory requirement of payment under the state plan. See id. at 4. PhRMA further con-
tended that the Secretary did not have the authority to grant such a waiver in any event.
See id.
171. See Thompson, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 75. In Thompson, the court held:
The Secretary did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law in approving portions of the Initiative, including the
prior authorization program, the efforts to secure supplemental rebates,
and the requirement that drug manufacturers provide rebates in non-
Medicaid programs in order to avoid prior authorization for drugs offered
for Medicaid use.
Id. at 85-86; see also Lueck, supra note 122, at Al.
172. See Winslow et al., supra note 122, at A8. On March 11, 2001, the state introduced
a preferred drugs list for more than 120,000 residents enrolled in Medicaid. Id. The pro-
gram encouraged manufacturers to mandatorily rebate a portion of the price of drugs pur-
chased directly by individuals who were not otherwise covered by the state's Medicaid
program. See id.
173. See PhRMA, 135 F. Supp 2d at 4-5; see also Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396
(2001).
174. See PhRMA, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 4.
175. Id. at 3.
176. PhRMA v. Thompson, 251 F.3d 219, 225-26 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that the fed-
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that the Secretary had no authority to approve the Medicaid pro-
gram in Vermont.177 Based on the Vermont decision, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia also found
that the Maine program violated the SSA. 7 '
d. The Supreme Court of the United States: Balancing Care and
Cost
In light of conflict between the circuits, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari179 and held in Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturing of America v. Walsh 8 ° that the Maine Program
did not impose a disparate burden on out-of-state manufacturers
in violation of the Commerce Clause. 181 The Court affirmed the
First Circuit's decision to vacate the district court's injunction
preventing Maine from implementing the Program as an abuse of
discretion.8 2 Interestingly, much like how TRIPS was not consid-
ered during the anthrax crisis, the Supreme Court also failed to
consider whether indirect price controls violated TRIPS. l8 3 The
Supreme Court, however, specifically favored indirect price con-
trols for non-Medicaid drugs. l14
eral government over-stepped its authority in allowing Vermont seniors and uninsured
residents to enroll in Medicaid to avail themselves of the program's low drug prices).
177. Id. at 221, 226.
178. After the appellate court found Vermont's program unlawful, Maine added a 2%
state contribution to the manufacturer rebates. But PhRMA filed suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, charging that the Maine program was illegal
under the SSA and consequently, the Secretary's previous approval of the program was
unreasonable under the APA. See PhRMA v. Thompson, 191 F. Supp. 2d 48, 51-52 (D.D.C.
2002). The appellate court found in favor of PhRMA since the program mirrored the Ver-
mont program. Thus the Maine Medicaid program, which was initially approved by the
First Circuit was held to violate the SSA by the D.C. circuit. See PhRMA v. Thompson, 313
F.3d 600, 604-05 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
179. Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2001), cert.
granted, 536 U.S. 956 (June 28, 2002) (No. 01-188).
180. 123 S. Ct. 1855 (2003).
181. See id. at 1871.
182. See id. at 1871. On the question of preemption, Justice Thomas concurred in the
judgment and validated the Secretary's approval of the state programs, concluding that
where an agency or an authority, like the Secretary, is charged with administering a fed-
eral statute, there is an insurmountable barrier to an obstacle preemption claim. Id. at
1877 (Thomas, J., concurring).
183. See infra Part IV.B.; see also Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1870.
184. See Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1870 (noting that "prior authorization may well have a
significant adverse impact on the manufacturers of brand name prescription drugs" and
that "any transfer of business to less expensive products will produce savings for the
Medicaid program").
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Justice Stevens concluded that the Medicaid Act did not pre-
empt Maine's and Michigan's programs insofar as manufacturers
are coerced into reducing prices of non-Medicaid sales. 8 5 Justice
Thomas, concurring, agreed with the Secretary's interpretation
that the Medicaid Act does not preclude states from negotiating
prices for non-Medicaid drugs.8
6
Referring to public health obligations, the Court ruled that a
state's "interest in protecting the health of its uninsured resi-
dents also provides a plainly permissible justification for [subject-
ing drug manufacturers that elected not to participate in its pre-
scription drug rebate program to] a prior authorization
requirement."18 7 The Court added that the cost-benefit from the
prior authorization program served the interests of both federal
and state governments. The Court further explained that "[t]he
impact on manufacturers is not relevant because any transfer of
business to less expensive products will produce savings for the
Medicaid program."88 Justice Thomas noted that the Program
achieved the delicate balance sought by the Medicaid statute be-
tween competing interests, care and cost, for example.8 9
Justice Thomas's opinion on balancing care and cost indirectly
answers an issue left open and never revisited by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Vitamin Tech-
nologists, Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation,9 °
where the court was asked to decide whether compulsory licens-
ing of a patent was warranted if the patent owner's actions or in-
actions affected public interest.'9 ' The standard followed by Jus-
tice Thomas indicates the need to balance, if not prioritize, public
interest with the patent monopoly. 92 To that extent, Justice
Thomas favors restricting patent rights for limited purposes. The
185. See id. at 1867, 1870.
186. Id. at 1877 (Thomas, J., concurring).
187. Id. at 1869.
188. Id. at 1870.
189. Id. at 1874 (Thomas, J., concurring).
190. 146 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1945). The case related to a patent for producing vitamin D
in food by exposure to ultraviolet radiation. Id. at 942. The patentee refused to license the
process for producing vitamin D in oleomargarine, "one of the foods of the poor." Id. at 943.
The court noted that the suppression of a patent essential to public health was arguably
"vastly more against public interest" than even antitrust or price tying arrangements. Id.
at 946-48. Although the court's dictum indicated that patent owners may be denied relief
if the patent was against public interest, it refused to rule on the issue. See id. at 944--46.
191. Id.
192. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1874-78 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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favorable tone toward indirect price control implies that devel-
oped nations are concerned with the form of price control, as op-
posed to price control itself. It is unclear why the United States
argued with developing nations that price control itself-and not
merely the form-mattered.
B. Health Crisis-Anthrax
In the past, developed nations, particularly the United States,
supported drug companies' rhetoric highlighting the need for
high-price branded drugs in order to fund further research and
development. 193 Developing nations were encouraged to keep up
with international obligations at the cost of not providing inex-
pensive drugs to the current generation in order to save a future
generation. 194 The anthrax crisis, however, demonstrates how the
United States, in the wake of a mere threat to public health, rele-
gated the importance of branded prices and future generations to
a secondary position and considered the compulsory licensing op-
tion to ensure access to drugs.
Anthrax, first reported in the United States on October 4, 2001,
increased to ten confirmed cases by November.'95 The circum-
stances surrounding the release of the infectious anthrax spores
accentuated the fear of an epidemic spread.' 9 Safeguarding pub-
lic health, by making an imminent supply of anthrax medication
available at affordable cost, became a national security issue. 97
193. See 145 CONG. REC. H9176-02 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1999) (statement of Rep.
Brown); see also Press Release, Biotechnology Industry Organization, BIO Strongly Op-
poses Compulsory Licensing (Sept. 23, 1999), available at http://lists.essential.org/pharm-
policy/msg00274.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2004); Letter from Rep. Sherrod Brown, to
America's Pharmaceutical CEOs (Sept. 29, 1999), available at http://lists.essential.org/
pharm-policy/msg00261.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2004); Bass, supra note 63, at 199-200.
194. See, e.g., Ragavan, supra note 36, at 181 n.546.
195. Centers for Disease Control of America, Bioterrorism-Related to Inhalation An-
thrax: The First 10 Cases Reported in the United States, EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES
(Nov. 2001), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol7no6/jernigan.htm (last visited
Mar. 31, 2004).
196. Id. Anthrax was linked to bio-terrorism caused by the intentional release of bacil-
lus anthracis spores.
197. See id.; see also James W. Parrett, Jr., A Proactive Solution to the Inherent Dan-
gers of Biotechnology: Using the Invention Secrecy Act to Restrict Disclosure of Threatening
Biotechnology Patents, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 145, 156 (2001); Russell
Mokhiber & Robert Weissman, The Cipro Rip-Off and Public Health, ZNET
COMMENTARIES, (Dec. 2, 2001), at http://www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/2001-12/02
Mokhiber-Weissman.cfm (last visited Mar. 31, 2004). The frontline response lacked the
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The United States determined that public affordability of the
medication was a priority-signifying a change from its tradi-
tional disregard to public affordability of medication in develop-
ing nations.19 The United States considered reducing the cost of
Cipro, the recommended anthrax medication, by either compulso-
rily licensing Bayer's Cipro patent or purchasing Cipro from ge-
neric sources.1 99
Incidentally, the United States government opposed the use of
both options by developing countries as violating TRIPS. Under a
threat to local public health, the issue of compliance with TRIPS
was not even raised internally by the United States government.
Both options restricted the extent of Bayer's ability to price the
drug above marginal cost. For example, compulsorily licensing
Cipro interfered with Bayer's right to exploit its patent. Pre-
sumably, the United States government reasoned that the in-
creased sales of Cipro-generated by the high-volume need for
the drug-would offset Bayer's profits from a higher market price
with comparatively limited sales. This is the reasoning the gov-
ernment repeatedly rejected when put forward by third-world
governments seeking AIDS medication at lower prices for mil-
lions of poverty stricken citizens."° The second option of procur-
ing generic ciprofloxin restricted Bayer's market share as a pat-
ent owner and cut into the profits allocated for research and
development. °1 The generic ciprofloxin refers to the third-world
training to react to the emergency of rapid contaminations from infectious diseases. Im-
portantly, the lack of training potentially exposed the local health care providers to the
risk of contracting the disease, leaving the prospect of prevention of the epidemic at stake.
Parrett, supra at 158. The government estimated the need for approximately 1.2 billion
Cipro pills, Mokhiber & Weissman, supra. Cipro, the recommended treatment for anthrax,
was sold at $4.50 per pill. Id. The treatment regimen included two pills for sixty days. Id.
198. See, e.g., Mokhibar & Weissman, supra note 199.
199. See id. (discussing the options available to, but not taken by the government). In
this context, the term "generic" refers to the generic drug industry of developed nations,
which introduces drugs after the expiration of patents, and of developing nations. See su-
pra note 131 and accompanying text. For the purpose of this section, however, where ap-
propriate, the term also refers to the drug industry in developing nations, which competes
with the producers of patented products.
200. See supra Part III.A.1.
201. The Center for Disease Control also began to recommend using the more afford-
able drug doxycycline instead of Cipro. See Canada Contracts for Generic Cipro, CNN, Oct.
19, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/americas/10/19/CANADA/generic.cipro/index.
html (last visited Mar. 31, 2004); Cipro, at http://www.cipro.pharma.bayer.com (last vis-
ited Mar. 31, 2004); Senator Charles Schumer approached Ranbaxy Ltd., an Indian ge-
neric drug company, to check availability of generic ciprofloxin at low cost. See Melinda T.
Willis, Officials Move Toward Doxycycline as First-Line Anthrax Treatment, ABC News,
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generic drugs produced in violation of patents.2 °2 The third-world
generics are anywhere from 200% to 250% as cost effective in
comparison with branded pharmaceuticals since they lack re-
search and development overhead. 2 3 That the United States
turned to the pariah of the drug industry-third-world generics-
demonstrates the anxiousness governments face in the wake of a
public health crisis.
Meanwhile, Canada, a long and trusted ally of the United
States, ignored the patents and bought Cipro from a generic drug
maker.0 4 Influenced by Canada, the United States Department of
Health and Human Services ("DHHS") threatened to compulso-
rily license Bayer's patent unless Cipro was available at what the
government considered fair price. 20 5 Thus DHHS did not compul-
sorily license the patent, but indirectly controlled the price of
Cipro at $0.95 a pill.2 6 The DHHS's actions are comparable to
what third-world countries would do under similar circum-
stances.2 °7 Meanwhile, the Public Health Emergency Medicines
Act ("Emergency Bill") was introduced to incorporate compulsory
licensing provisions in the patent legislation.2 8 Significantly,
Oct. 30, 2001, available at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/living/DailyNews/doxycycline
011030.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2004); see also See Indian Pharmaceutical Companies
Prepared To Provide Generic Cipro, REUTERS HEALTH, Nov. 25, 2001, at httpJ/www.infect
ioncontroltoday.com/hotnews/lah2511050.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2004). See generally
Manu Joseph, Indian Cipro Copies Don't Pay Off, WIRED NEWS, Nov 8, 2001, at
http://www.wired.com/news/medtech/0,1286,48153,00.html. (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
202. Generic drug companies like Cipla Ltd. and Dr. Reddy's Laboratories (Indian cor-
porations) were willing to sell Cipro for less than twenty cents per pill. See Andrew Tan-
zer, Pill Factories to the World, FORBES, Dec. 10, 2001, at 70.
203. Id.
204. See Amy Harmon & Robert Pear, Canada Overrides Patent for Cipro to Treat An-
thrax, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2001, at Al. Canadian officials stockpiled medication from Apo-
tex, Inc., a Toronto-based generic drug manufacturer to treat 100,000 people. Canada
overrode Bayer's patent for ciprofloxin and ordered a million tablets of the generic version
from Apotex, which sold Cipro for $0.63 less than the approximately $1.25 Bayer charged
for a 500-milligram tablet.
205. See Charles Schumer, Editorial, The Cipro Circus, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2001, at
A20; see also Manu Joseph, supra note 201.
206. Mokhiber & Weissman, supra note 197.
207. Id.
208. Public Health Emergency Medicines Act, H.R 3235, 107th Cong. § 2 (2001) [here-
inafter Emergency Bill]. The Emergency Bill sought to amend Title 35 of the United
States Code to allow the government to compulsorily license patents during health care
exigencies. The Emergency Bill contemplated "reasonable remuneration" for the patent
holder based on factors associated with the invention including the risk and costs and ex-
tent of public investments. Id. § 2(b). The Emergency Bill was referred to the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, but it died in committee-probably because the bio-terrorism at-
tempts ceased.
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other similar bills introduced in the past were also not passed due
to strong opposition by both industry and practitioners.2"9 The
Emergency Bill, although not passed because the bio-terrorism
attempts ceased, faced limited industrial opposition most likely
due to the obvious government interest in securing public
needs.210 This limited industry opposition to the reaction of the
United States government staunchly contradicted the industry's
move in third-world nations, especially South Africa, where scant
regard to public interest was displayed.21' Part of the blame for
the industry's reaction can be apportioned to the American gov-
ernment, which continuously supported the industry and pre-
vented the respective governments from prioritizing national re-
sponsibilities.
V. LEGAL ANALYSIS
The American policies implemented in the wake of its own eco-
nomic and health crises are comparable to the very policies ob-
jected to by the United States in developing nations reacting to
AIDS.2"2 Considering this, the economic loss developing nations
suffered from being unable to fulfill national responsibilities is
quantified as the poverty penalty. Part V explains the poverty
penalty and argues that the provisions of TRIPS do not envision
more flexibility to developed nations. It argues that the poverty
penalty adversely affected both global trade and the pharmaceu-
tical industry.
209. See Affordable Prescription Drugs and Medical Inventions Act, H.R. 1708, 107th
Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Affordable Bill]. The Secretary of Health and Human Services
could grant compulsory licenses: (a) if the patent is not used; (b) public health emergencies
require it; (c) the patent holder engages in anti-competitive behavior; or (d) the patent
blocks other patented inventions. H.R. 1708 § 2; see also Allan Z. Litovsky, The Law of Un-
intended Consequences: How Will the Affordable Prescription Drugs and Medical Inven-
tions Act Affect American Health Care?, 13 HEALTH LAWYER 20 (2001) (discussing the Af-
fordable Bill in detail). The Affordable Bill was referred to the House Committee on the
Judiciary and the Committee on Energy and Commerce. The committees referred the Bill
to the Subcommittee on Courts, Internet, and Intellectual Property and the Subcommittee
on Health respectively; however, no further action was taken. See The Affordable Prescrip-
tions Drug Act, H.R. 2927, 106th Cong. (1999). See generally Yosick, supra note 43, at 1278
n.20 (for a discussion on House Bill 2927). Generally, the Affordable Bill, the Hart Bill,
and House Bill 2927 proposed compulsory licensing of patents affecting public health,
safety, or protection of the environment.
210. See Bass, supra note 63, at 211-13.
211. See Patent Problems Pending, ECONOMIST, Oct. 25, 2001, at 14; see also supra
notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
212. Patent Problems Pending, supra note 211, at 14. ("The rich world should apply the
same rules to drugs in poor countries as at home.").
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A. The Validity of the Poverty Penalty
1. Prevalence of the Poverty Penalty
When developing nations cited weak local economic conditions
as necessitating a balancing of patent rights, the United States
opposed any such balancing. However, in the United States, do-
mestic initiatives balanced care and cost to ensure adequate ac-
cess to drugs every time local economic conditions deteriorated.
The introduction of the rebate system for Medicaid in the 1990s213
and amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act reducing post-patent
exclusivity in 2001 serve as examples of such balancing.214
In developing nations, TRIPS compliant amendments may sig-
nificantly increase the cost of medication.215 Yet the WTO and the
developed nations, in preventing balancing measures, ignored the
impact of the poor economic conditions of developing nations on
accessibility of medication. The United States encouraged many
impoverished countries to follow IP policies by requiring such
213. When prescription drug expenditure increased by 179% for Medicaid drugs due to
the bad economic conditions of the 1990s, Congress enacted the cost saving rebate system.
See Ford, supra note 122, at 15 (showing that Medicaid expenditures for all other services
increased by only 134%). The Medicaid statute mandated drug companies to pay rebates
to states on their Medicaid purchases. Id. at 32-33. But the percentages of rebates were
not meant to be enforced by the state. Id. (discussing federal limitations on state drug se-
lection). States were also not empowered to discriminate between companies based on the
percentage of the discounts.
214. The United States promoted generic drugs by amending the Hatch-Waxman Act
in 1984. See 98 Stat. 1585 (1984); see also FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY
PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 1-11 (2002) (discussing the history of the
Hatch-Waxman Act). The amendment encouraged earlier introduction of generic drugs by
introducing § 271(e) of the United States Code, which provided that it is not an infringe-
ment to use a patented invention for gathering data to support an FDA application for ge-
neric drugs. Section 271(1)(e) was enacted to ensure faster reach of less expensive medica-
tion. See 98 Stat. 1585. Similarly, the slowing economy of 2001, in the background of an
increase in expenditure on prescription drugs by 19%, forced state governments to indi-
rectly control the price of Medicaid drugs. In 2003, when the economy deteriorated further,
the federal government proposed another amendment to quicken the introduction of ge-
neric drugs. See 98 Stat. 1585. The amendment limits the challenges available for phar-
maceutical companies to delay or block introduction of generic drugs by filing additional
claims or seeking injunctions. Earlier it was assumed that the longer the exclusivity, the
higher the incentive to innovate. The amendment 136, at A24; see also Goldstein, supra
note 136, at A6.
215. In 1996, Jayashree Watal argued that the static price impact of patent protection
in India could raise average drug prices by perhaps 50% from a 1994 base. See Jayashree
Watal, Introducing Product Patents in the Indian Pharmaceutical Sector: Implications for
Prices and Welfare, WORLD COMPETITION: L. & ECON. REV., Dec. 1996, at 5, 18.
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countries to pay the cost of branded drugs. Examples of these de-
veloping nations include: Eritrea with a GDP of $750;216 Ethiopia
with a per capita gross domestic product ("GDP") of $560;217 So-
malia with a GDP of $600;21 Tanzania with a GDP of $550;219 and
Zambia with a GDP of $880.22 0 Included among these African na-
tions are other developing nations like India, with 320 million
people living below the poverty index,22' and Brazil with 597,000
HIV patients.222
Historically, the United States has advised developing coun-
tries exercising price controls over essential commodities
prompted by bad economic conditions to find means to fund the
price of branding.223 When bad economic conditions deprived the
relatively richer American state governments' funds, instead of
finding funding to support brand prices, the state governments
opted for indirect price control measures.224 In PhRMA v. Walsh,
Justice Thomas argues that the state governments' attempts are
an essential, if not commendable, "delicate balance ... between
competing interests."225
The "delicate balance" Justice Thomas refers to is precisely
what the price control measures of all developing countries seek
to achieve. If Justice Thomas envisions a "delicate balance" in a
nation with a higher per capita income to assist the poverty
stricken, the exercise of balancing between economic and social
welfare in developing countries is bound to be dire and less deli-
cate. Instead, in opposing efforts by developing nations, higher
priority was placed on manufacturers' profits and not on cost-
effectiveness for the government. In dealing with local issues,
216. Id. at 68.
217. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INSTITUTE, PATENT PROTECTION AND
ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS PHARMACEUTICALS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 69 (2000).
218. Id. at 88.
219. Id. at 91.
220. Id. at 94.
221. INDIA PLANNING COMM'N, NINTH FIvE YR. PLAN, 1997-2002, § 2.1.1 (1999), avail-
able at http://planningcommission.nic.in/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
222. NAT'L STD/AIDS PROGRAMME, NATIONAL AIDS DRUGS POLICY 5 (2001), available
at http://www.aids.gov.br/new-drug-policy.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2004); see also Raga-
van, supra note 36.
223. See supra Part III.A.
224. See Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. 1855, 1860 (2003) (not-
ing that the "state legislatures have enacted supplemental rebate programs to achieve ad-
ditional cost savings on Medicaid purchases").
225. See id. at 1874 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Justice Thomas dismissed manufacturers' profits as "irrelevant,"
so long as it was cost-effective for the government. 226 Thus, within
the United States, impact on manufacturers was irrelevant in en-
suring medical services to the needy. However, the United States
considered manufacturer profits as the main reason to preclude
developing nations' efforts to make medical services affordable to
the poor.227 Thus, drug manufacturers who appreciated the
American need to balance between the rich and needy failed to
extend the same appreciation to those living below poverty levels
in developing nations. This policy resulted in developing nations
being unable to balance patent rights and public interest and,
therefore, prevent public health disasters. The United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted in appreciation of
balancing measures:
[Wihen people whose incomes fall outside Medicaid eligibility are
unable to purchase necessary medication, their conditions may
worsen, driving them further into poverty and into the Medicaid pro-
gram, requiring more expensive treatment that could have been
avoided had earlier intervention been possible.
228
Earlier intervention was exactly what developing nations like
South Africa wanted to achieve by making medication more ac-
cessible to the poorer sections of the society. Developing countries
sought early intervention for the noble and economically sound
objective of avoiding more expensive treatment if AIDS became
an epidemic. The issue of early intervention has a greater rele-
vance in developing nations since the cost of medication is borne
by patients. Instead, the proposed plans of South Africa, Thai-
land, and Brazil were touted as economically unsound human
rights initiatives.229
226. See id. at 1876 (Thomas, J., concurring). The Court held that "[alvoiding unneces-
sary costs in the administration of a State's Medicaid program obviously serves the inter-
ests of both the Federal Government and the States that pay the cost of providing pre-
scription drugs to Medicaid patients." Id. at 1868 (Thomas, J., concurring).
227. See Bass, supra note 63, at 199 (noting that developed countries claim that com-
pulsory licensing deters investment in the pharmaceutical industry). See generally Grace
K. Avedissian, Comment, Global Implications of a Potential U.S. Policy Toward Compul-
sory Licensing of Medical Inventions in a New Era of "Super Terrorism," 18 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 237, 244 (2002).
228. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 76 (1st Cir. 2001),
cert. granted, 536 U.S. 956 (June 28, 2002) (No. 01-188).
229. For a discussion of such initiatives, see generally Bass, supra note 63.
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2. TRIPS Resulting in Poverty Penalty
As previously discussed, the United States prioritized prevent-
ing an epidemic infection during the anthrax crisis, when a mere
threat existed.13 ' Ten cases of one disease resulted in the recon-
sideration of the option of compulsory licensing-a proposition
that the United States has traditionally never believed to be an
option.2 31 Canada went ahead and exercised the compulsory li-
censing option.232 Thus, the mere threat of an epidemic forced de-
veloped nations to compromise principles they advocated to other
nations and abided by for decades. In contrast, the impoverished
and economically deprived developing countries-which host mil-
lions of citizens infected with several diseases-were precluded
from using any flexibility within TRIPS.233 When these develop-
ing and least-developed nations opted for compulsory licensing
provisions, they were actually in the midst of a public health cri-
sis. Yet the developed nations prevented them from exercising
this option, despite the fact that the United States felt compelled
to consider the same option when there were ten cases of anthrax.
Thus, the United States, because of its global leadership posi-
tion in trade, contemplated exactly what it encouraged third-
world governments to abstain from. The poverty penalty of third-
world governments lies in those governments' inability to priori-
tize their national responsibilities because their economic inter-
ests depend on trade with the developed nations. Thus developing
nations were forced to fulfill obligations under TRIPS which the
developed nations themselves were unwilling to fulfill. The pov-
erty penalty resulting from the operation of TRIPS merely forced
developing nations-and not developed nations-to compromise
their national responsibilities.
Some critics, however, would categorize the United States' re-
action to anthrax as an exception, rather than a precedent.234
230. Ragavan, supra note 36, at 167.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See Bass, supra note 63, at 199-201 (showing that the United States and other
developed countries interpreted TRIPS narrowly and that many developing nations aban-
doned their compulsory licensing plans due to threats of trade sanctions from developed
nations).
234. See, e.g., Richard Armitage, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Eli Lilly,
Address at the Cardozo Law School Symposium on Patent Law, Social Policy, and Public
Interest: The Search for a Balanced Global System (Nov. 7, 2002).
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Even these critics do not argue that had anthrax become an epi-
demic within the United States, American citizens who could not
afford the patented ciprofloxin should die. Even if academics
committed to intellectual property rights did make such an ar-
gument, the United States Constitution would prevent the gov-
ernment from endorsing such a view.235 Hence, most proponents
of the "anthrax as an exception" doctrine have shown preference
for the use of an alternate solution to compulsory licensing, with-
out diluting patents in a public health crisis.236 The world, how-
ever, does not possess such an alternate solution.237 The world
would be rid of its problems if we only had a doctrine--other than
compulsory licensing-that catered to anthrax-like exceptions on
a larger scale. Moreover, a precedent does not lose its value
unless overturned. Even the United States and Canadian gov-
ernments have not devised alternate strategies to combat future
threats of bio-terrorism, thus signifying the value of their reac-
tions to the anthrax crisis as precedent. Until developed nations
adhere to patents in the face of a public health crisis-which
should never happen-anthrax will continue to be a precedent.
Therefore, developing nations are well within their rights to call
the reaction to anthrax a precedent. Just as American citizens
who cannot afford ciprofloxin should not die, citizens of other na-
tions, even poor nations, do not deserve death due to lack of af-
fordability. No strict interpretation of TRIPS can dilute the sov-
ereign duty of respective governments to uphold the right to life
of their nationals.
3. Violation of TRIPS from Poverty Penalty
The reaction of the United States to crises outside its borders
resulted in developing nations being subjected to a more rigorous
operation of TRIPS. In effect, the value placed on the life of a poor
235. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Article I, section 8, clause 1 specifies that "[t]he
Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay
the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States"
while clause 8 vests the power "Itlo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." Id. Thus, the power to promote intellectual properties vested in
clause 8 is subject to the general welfare condition in Article I, section 8. Id.
236. See generally TRIPS, supra note 3, pmbl.
237. See generally Avedissian, supra note 227, at 286-88 (recommending the incorpora-
tion of compulsory licensing provisions in national laws worldwide-including the United
States-as the only solution to tackle public health crises).
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person living within developing nations was not considered suffi-
cient to warrant affecting manufacturers' profits or patents. De-
veloped nations placed more value on the life of a poor person in a
developed nation vis-&-vis the protection of IP rights. Such treat-
ment violates the national treatment clause in Article 3 of TRIPS,
which no member is allowed to derogate.2 3' Article 3 specifies that
"[elach Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members
treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own na-
tionals with regard to the protection of intellectual property."239
However, as evidenced by the anthrax scare, favors enjoyed by
nationals of developed nations include accessing medication with-
out being precluded by TRIPS.
Such treatment amounts to "abuse of intellectual property
rights by right holders" under Article 8-warranting appropriate
corrective measures.24 ° Additionally, it violates Article 65, which
provides for a transitional period for the developing and least-
developed country members. 241' Article 65(3) indicates that the pe-
riod of delay is provided as a form of discrimination meant to pro-
tect least-developed nation members.242 Instead, the poverty pen-
alty operates as a form of punitive discrimination punishing poor
nations simply for being poor. Article 65(3) illustrates that the
protective discrimination was meant to "benefit" the poor nations,
but the punitive discrimination that these nations suffered actu-
ally detrimentally affected their economies and the public
health.243
The TRIPS commitments in Article 1, which do not require
members to "implement in their. .. law more extensive protec-
tion than is required by this Agreement," should be respected.2"
The flexibilities in Article 31 and the protective discrimination in
238. See TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 3.
239. Id.
240. See id. art. 8 ("Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the
provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property
rights by right holders.").
241. See id. art. 65 (establishing Transitional Arrangements).
242. Id. ("Any other Member which is in the process of transformation from a centrally-
planned into a market, free-enterprise economy and which is undertaking structural re-
form of its intellectual property system and facing special problems in the preparation and
implementation of intellectual property laws, may also benefit from a period of delay as
foreseen in paragraph 2. ..
243. Id.
244. See id. art. 1 ("Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their do-
mestic law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that
such protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement.").
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Article 65 signify that IP protection that destroys national econo-
mies and consequently adversely affects international trade2 45 is
not what is envisaged by the phrase "required by this Agreement"
in Article 1.246
Finally, all the Objectives of TRIPS enshrined in Article 7 will
be violated.247 The disproportionate increase in cost of medication
vis-&-vis the per capita income will violate the "social welfare" ob-
jective.24 The adverse effect on productivity, detailed in the next
section, will affect "economic welfare."249 Lack of social and eco-
nomic welfare itself deters foreign investment especially in coun-
tries facing public health crisis.2 ° Thus, the "promotion of techno-
logical innovation" contemplated in Article 7 will be affected. In
effect the Article 7 promise of mutual benefit from TRIPS to pro-
ducers and users of technology will be compromised.251 Such bar-
riers also defeat the purpose of TRIPS enshrined in the pream-
ble.25 2 The preamble of TRIPS cautions against, "[m]easures and
procedures to enforce intellectual property rights" from becoming
"barriers to legitimate trade."253 TRIPS conveniently does not ad-
dress what happens if enforcing IP rights itself becomes a barrier
to trade.
Intellectual property laws have the ultimate objective of pro-
moting the "public good" or "public benefit."25 TRIPS itself was
drafted to reduce distortions in trade so that all members could
benefit.255 Therein lies the public benefit rationale envisaged by
245. See supra Part III.B.
246. See TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 1.
247. See TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 7.
248. See also 't Hoen, supra note 35, at 30; Seeratan, supra note 35, at 388 (discussing
that TRIPS will result in increase in cost of medication).
249. See supra Part IV.B.
250. Seeratan, supra note 35, at 382-86, 389-90; see also EDWIN MANSFIELD, INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, AND TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY (International Finance Corporation, Discussion Paper No. 19, 1994) (arguing
that in the long run TRIPS is likely to facilitate foreign investment). But see Paul Heald, A
Critical Analysis of Mansfield's Canonical Study, INTERNAT'L FIN. CORP. DISCUSSION
PAPER #19 (1994).
251. See TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 7.
252. See TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 7, pmbl.
253. Id. pmbl.
254. The public good and benefit theories are essentially mandated by the Constitution
of the United States. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See generally Divya Murthy, The Fu-
ture of Compulsory Licensing: Deciphering the Doha Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement
and Public Health, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1299, 1327 (2002) (deciphering the definition of
the term public health).
255. See TRIPS, supra note 3, pmbl. A major objective of the TRIPS Agreement is to
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TRIPS.256 Moreover, the preamble of TRIPS recognizes the "public
policy objectives of national systems ... including developmen-
tal.., objectives" and supports the proposition that public benefit
is the cornerstone of the intellectual property rights theory.257
Currently, the function of TRIPS, especially concerning the pov-
erty penalty, can be justified only if those who live outside of de-
veloped nations are excluded from the definition of "public." Nei-
ther intellectual property law nor international law adequately
supports such a construction. Because of this construction, the
public benefit doctrine should be treated as a limitation on intel-
lectual property rights-particularly patents. Article 31 of TRIPS,
read with the Doha Declaration, supports such a construction by
authorizing governments to use the "flexibilities" approach of
Doha to tackle national objectives.258 Moreover, the reaction of
developed nations to the anthrax crisis should serve as a prece-
dent in support of the public benefit rationale of Article 31.
B. The Effect of the Poverty Penalty on Developing Nations
All nations embrace intellectual property rights as a means to
further development. Patents largely have enabled the residents
of developed nations to access high-priced life-saving drugs.259
TRIPS implies that patents will further research and develop-
ment.260 This section demonstrates the effect of the poverty pen-
alty on local conditions.
'reduce distortions and impediments to international trade, and tak[e] into account the
need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to
ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not them-
selves become barriers to legitimate trade.. . ." Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See id., art. 31; see also Doha Declaration, supra note 25, at cl. 5.
259. See Tina Rosenberg, Look at Brazil, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 28, 2001, at 26, 28,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/library/magazine/home/20010128mag-aids.html (last
visited Mar. 31, 2004). In Brazil, drug manufacturers, in return for the risks of developing
new drugs, receive a twenty-year market exclusivity. Id. at 28.
260. See Avedissian, supra note 227, at 251 (citing the discovery of new drugs through
incentives for future research and development as a long-term objective of TRIPS). How-
ever, owing to the lack of the developing nation markets to bear the cost of patented prod-
ucts, patents have resulted in lack of research on diseases unique to developing nations
and deprived these markets from access to essential medication. Only nations with a vi-
brant generic drug market like India have been able to provide access to medication and
thus offset the cost of TRIPS. Jeffrey Sachs, Helping the World's Poorest, ECONOMIST, Aug.




For instance, within developing nations, AIDS-infected people
with limited access to testing and medication have spread the in-
fection. Lack of medication has affected standards of living, some-
times permanently, either from loss of loved ones or loss of good
health. An epidemic increase of AIDS reduced life expectancy and
affected labor and economic output, as the younger casualties in-
crease.261 Consequently, national productivity declined in several
developing nations since the loss of labor from the loss of each life
affected a proportionate value of output.26 2 That is, when AIDS
assumed epidemic proportions, the loss of adult labor impacted
overall economic output in every sector, ranging from health, to
tourism, to agriculture and to mining.263
Assuming that a person's productivity is derived from several
indicators, such as: living conditions; earning potential; or per
capita income; the loss of each adult life in his/her most produc-
tive age represents an equivalent deprivation of productivity to
the economy. 264 Thus, the loss each developing nation suffers by
not taking adequate steps to curtail AIDS at the appropriate
juncture is represented by the resulting cumulative loss of pro-
ductivity ("V ") as follows:
V = (v * (m-n)); where, "v" represents the average individual
productivity; "n" represents the number infected with AIDS at a
time when an epidemic infection could have been prevented by
supplying adequate medication; 265 and 'W' represents the total
infected population in any given year. Assuming that every year
the AIDS-infected population, in turn, infects an average per-
centage of healthy population represented by "x," the number in-
261. See BOLLINGER & STOVER, supra note 117, at 3. Epidemic outbreaks potentially
affect several sectors of the international economy and stunt international markets. Id.;
see also Rebecca Buckman, Outbreak Crimps Toy Industry's Buying Season, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 30, 2003, at B1 (discussing that the outbreak of SARS in China has affected sales in
even smaller industries, like the toy industry, and impacted the sales of several American
retailers).
262. See BOLLINGER & STOVER, supra note 117, at 12.
263. See id. at 5-11.
264. For example, the United States Environmental Protection Agency values human
life at an average of $6 million, while the Department of Transportation valued human life
at $3 million. See John J. Fiakla, Balancing Act: Lives vs. Regulations, WALL ST. J., May
30, 2003, at A4 (discussing some of the issues concerning amendments to the standard sta-
tistical measures to value human life).
265. See supra Part III.A.1. For example, for South Africa, n will be represented by the
number of AIDS infected persons in 1996, when South Africa requested medicines at low
costs from the United States.
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fected in "y" years would be "m = n * (1+xY." Thus V = v * (m-
n).66 represents the cumulative loss of productivity for each devel-
oping nation because of not being able to take adequate action at
the appropriate time.
The cumulative loss of productivity is limited to the loss from
labor alone. It specifically does not include the total loss from
other factors of productivity-"total factor productivity"-from
costs affecting the economy. Examples of other costs range from
the increasing cost of employee medical benefits to the deterrence
such costs create for foreign investments.6 7 For example, the in-
creased incidence of AIDS in South Africa will raise the cost of
employee medical benefits from 7% of income in 1995 to 19% of
income by the year 2005.26' The increased cost of employee bene-
fits have impacted the overall economic productivity and output,
especially since the additional costs have been at the same time
that productivity is declining.2 69 This is represented by the for-
mula, L, = [V, + Cost of AIDS care + other miscellaneous costs].
"Lp" represents the total loss of productivity. "L," refers to the de-
cline in economic productivity in developing nations alone be-
cause they were prevented from prioritizing national responsibili-
ties.27 0 The poverty penalty is, at the minimum, equal to the loss
of productivity represented by L.
Critics may argue that labor productivity is not the only ele-
ment of economic development and that TRIPS facilitates foreign
investments. However, in most poor nations, labor has been, and
continues to remain, the main factor of productivity.2 7 ' TRIPS,
unfortunately, has affected the sole source of economic productiv-
ity without supplementing or substituting the loss of labor pro-
ductivity with other sources of economic development. The dimin-
ishment of the main factor of productivity-labor, in this case,
due to increased disease conditions-has detrimentally affected
other sources of economic development, like foreign invest-
ments.2 72 Foreign investors naturally lose incentive to invest in
countries where the main factor of productivity is quickly declin-
266. Lp = v * (n x (1+xY -n); i.e., Lp = v * (m-n).
267. See, e.g., BOLLINGER & STOVER, supra note 117, at 6.
268. Id.
269. AIDS Toll on Regional Economies, SOUTHERN AFRICAN ECONOMIST, May 15, 1997.
270. See supra Part 1V.B.
271. See also BOLLINGER & STOVER, supra note 117, at 3.
272. See id. at 3.
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ing due to disease. Thus, the deterrence of the AIDS epidemic to
foreign investors is higher than the incentive to investment from
signing TRIPS. For example, AIDS affected the profitability of
Anglo American, a mining conglomerate with operations in Af-
rica, by causing absenteeism, deaths, and increased medical costs
for AIDS-related illnesses." 3 The company was on the verge of
losing 30,000 members of its South African workforce to AIDS. 4
As such, Anglo American decided to bear the cost of treating its
infected employees and their spouses.7
Such increases in medical expenditures serve as disincentives
to investment. The existing application of TRIPS does little to al-
leviate the disincentives caused by AIDS and other communicable
diseases. Some studies project that the benefits from TRIPS will
manifest themselves only in the long run.276 The AIDS epidemic,
however, threatens to wipe out nations from existence in the
short run277 -long before the benefits from TRIPS can be mani-
fested. So far, the only economically perceivable result of the post-
TRIPS era for poorer African countries has been the increase in
the AIDS epidemic. There certainly has been no evidence of any
significant increase in foreign investment from TRIPS in any of
these poorer countries.278 On the other hand, measurable eco-
273. See Follow My Lead, ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 2003, at 68-69.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 68-69.
276. See Robert M. Sherwood, The TRIPS Agreement: Implications for Developing
Countries, 37 IDEA 491, 493-95 (1997). "[T]he impact of the TRIPS Agreement on most
developing countries is likely to be slightly negative in the short run (one to two years) and
increasingly favorable as local firms and individuals begin to realize the potential benefits
for their activities." Id. at 510. Sherwood, however, notes that TRIPS may be able to pro-
mote foreign investment, but will not be an aide in encouraging domestic research and de-
velopment. Id. at 495, 508. See generally Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Chal-
lenges for Developing Countries: An Economic Perspective, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 457 (2001)
(arguing that expanded property rights protection is needed to promote long-term eco-
nomic growth and technological innovations in developing countries).
277. See The World Today: Bush To Visit African Nations, (ABC NEWS television
broadcast, July 7, 2003), available at http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/contentl
2003/s896693.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2004) (detailing the plight of African nations and
their fight for survival); see also Jenni Fredriksson-Bass & Annabel Kanabus, HIV &
AIDS in Botswana, AVERT (2003), at http://www.avert.org/aidsbotswana.htm (last visited
Mar. 17, 2004).
278. See Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, The Relationship Between Intellectual
Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 163, 181 (1998)
(concluding that there is no evidence that IP rights result in increased foreign direct in-
vestments-although IP rights have such a potential, provided other political, social, and
economic factors coincide-and arguing that developing countries now reforming their IP
rights regimes offer a unique opportunity for before and after studies).
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nomic growth has in fact occurred in China and India, both of
which refuse to fully comply with TRIPS.279 This argument does
not undermine the requirement that poor countries need to en-
courage foreign investment by improving fiscal discipline, pro-
moting IP rights, and reducing government regulatory burdens.
Other critics argue that some countries, especially African na-
tions, were poor before signing TRIPS. Poor nations, however,
signed TRIPS not out of an ideological commitment to intellectual
property rights but in the hope of improving national living condi-
tions.28 ° Implicit in the decision to sign TRIPS was either improv-
ing living standards or leaving the status quo unaltered. TRIPS,
however, has not only made these countries poorer but has also
eroded national health."' The poverty in these nations before
TRIPS was signed cannot become a justification for the WTO to
worsen or even maintain the status quo of living conditions. The
success of TRIPS and intellectual property rights will not be
judged by its ideological righteousness, but in the ability to im-
prove living conditions.
279. See DOMINIC WILSON & ROOPA PURUSHOTHAMAN, GLOBAL ECONOMICS PAPER No.
99: DREAMING WITH BRICS: THE PATH TO 2050, GOLDMAN SACHS GLOBAL ECONOMICS
RESEARCH (Oct. 1, 2003), available at http://www.gs.com/insight/research/reports/99.pdf
(last visited Mar. 31, 2004) (arguing that Brazil, Russia, India, and China-the BRICs
economies-in less than forty years, will together account for over half the size of the G6);
see also Follow the Yellow BRIC Road, ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 2003, at 74 (arguing that the
Chinese economy will become bigger than any of the G7 economies, which consist of the
United States, Japan, Germany, France, Britain, Italy, and Canada); Ying and yuan,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 30, 2003, at 53-54 (stating that the GDP grew at an annual rate of 8.2%
in the first half of this year, compared with an official target of 7%); Press Release, Em-
bassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Norway, China to Achieve 8%
Growth in Late-Half (Sept. 4, 2003), at http-//www.chinese-embassy.no/eng/55520.html
(last visited Mar. 31, 2004) (detailing that the projected increase in the Chinese annual
growth is 8% of the GDP); Drew Kershen, Innovations in Biotechnology-Public Percep-
tions and Cultural Attitudes: An American's Viewpoint, Presentation at the Department of
Justice-Canada, 2002 Biotechnology Conference, Ottawa, Canada, Feb. 21, 2002, (con-
trasting the setbacks from the Imperial Chinese's attitude towards globalization against
the gains from the American willingness to take domestic risks by opening global trade as
a trendsetter for the rest of the world). See generally Tilting at Dragons, ECONOMIST, Oct.
25, 2003, at 65 (detailing that America's exports to China rose by 21% during the past
year, compared with an increase of 2% in sales to the rest of the world). The study by
Goldman Sachs adds that the total output of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China)
economies will overtake that of the G6 in less than forty years). See WILSON &
PURUSHOTHAMAN, supra.
280. See Thomas F. Mullin, AIDS, Anthrax, and Compulsory Licensing: Has the United
States Learned Anything?, 9 ILSA J. INVL & COMP. L. 185, 188 (2002).
281. See Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree: The WTO,




C. National Distress and the Effects on Global Welfare
This section argues that neither on a national nor on a global
level did the poverty penalty suffered by developing nations yield
any perceivable benefit justifying the manner of operation of
TRIPS. Without discussing the general benefits of TRIPS, this
section argues that there has been no economic benefit from
TRIPS to offset the loss of productivity developing nations suf-
fered from the TRIPS impediment to accessing medication.
Within the developing nations TRIPS has not resulted in any
significant increase in foreign direct investments ("FDI") or other
economic benefits to offset the economic loss suffered from not
preventing or treating AIDS adequately at the appropriate junc-
ture. This may be expressed as [National gains from FDI] < L.
Similarly, at a global level, TRIPS has not resulted in any per-
ceivable trade or economic benefit to offset the cumulative loss of
productivity-expressed as ("Lc")-in several developing coun-
tries. Therefore, global economic gain is less than Lpc
, 
where LPC
refers to the total loss of productivity of all developing nations.
Instead, international trade is bound to have been affected
from the consequential impact of AIDS on labor productivity in
developing countries.2"2 The effect of Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS) on national economies is a case to the point.28"
The outbreak of SARS in China affected several economies by im-
pacting international air travel and tourism.2" The SARS prece-
dent only reinforces the argument that preventing an outbreak by
providing medication (even by reducing the price of medication)
can be more cost effective solution for achieving the TRIPS objec-
tive of betterment of international trade. In fact, on a global level,
the loss of economic productivity in developing nations due to
AIDS has not significantly improved global trade or welfare
enough to justify imposing TRIPS in a manner that prevented ac-
282. See generally, Interview by Siddhartha Prakash, WTO Consultant with B.K Rai-
zada and Ajit Yadav, Vice-President and Legal Services Director, Ranbaxy India Limited,
Trade and Development Case Studies, (1998) [hereinafter Raizada Interview], available at
http://www.itd.org/issues/india 5a.htm. (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
283. See Rebecca Buckman, supra note 261, at B1 (discussing that the outbreak of
SARS in China has affected sales in even smaller industries like the top industry and im-
pacted sales of several American retailers); see also Nadia Natasha Seeratan, The Nega-
tive Impact of Intellectual Property Patent Rights on Development Countries: An Examina-
tion of the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry, 3 SCHOLAR 339, 346, 388-89 (2001).
284. Buckman, supra note 283, at B1, B5.
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cess to life saving medication. Global trade additionally suffered
because the commitment to save the AIDS infected translated
into costs for the developed nations.285 It is too soon to analyze
whether the cost to the United States-assuming AIDS remains
uncontained-will exceed the gains that the American economy
would have realized had the developing world embraced patented
pharmaceuticals at the outset. In any case, the war on terror has
highlighted that destroying the sense of hope by depriving medi-
cation in already fragmented, poor societies results in furthering
fundamentalism rather than global trade. 286 Global development
and democracy has inevitably become a subset of the global and
United States trade paradigm.2 7 The symbiotic relationship that
should result between the developed and developing nations will
hopefully reduce the poverty penalty by exemplifying that global
trade regimes cannot be isolated from global welfare.288 The suc-
cess of international conventions is not in ignoring global welfare
by favoring global trade, but in making welfare efforts, like Arti-
cle 31 of TRIPS, functional within the trade agenda.
285. For example, the American government budgeted $480 million in foreign assis-
tance to contain AIDS. Later, the United States promised $200 million to fight AIDS in
Africa specifically. See Michael M. Phillips, Rapt Powell Hears of AIDS Suffering, WALL
ST. J. EUR., May 29, 2001, at 2; see also Michael M. Phillips, Big Boost in U.S. AIDS Spend-
ing Eases Powell's Reception in Africa, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2001, at A24. The President's
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief releases $15 billion over five years for HIV/AIDS relief.
See Martin Hutchinson, Will U.S. AIDS Cash Make a Difference?, BBC News, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk2//hi/health/2943572.stm (last visited Feb. 25, 2004). Additionally, the
United States announced, on December 20, 2002, its intention to permit poor countries to
override patents of medications used to treat HPV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and other
infectious epidemics, including those that may arise in the future. Press Release, Office of
the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (Jan. 29,
2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases2003/01/20030129-1.html
(last visited Mar. 31, 2004). After resisting developing nations until AIDS became an epi-
demic, the United States government determined that overriding patents "is an immedi-
ate, practical solution that will provide life-saving drugs to those truly in need." Id.
286. See Robert Zoellick, Free Trade, Free People, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2002, at A14.
The United States realized that when poor people are denied basic necessities, they be-
come easy prey to destructive fundamentalism. Id.
287. See id. The current trade policy of the United States is not limited to internal
trade interests. Today's trade agenda emphasizes that the entire world has a stake in de-
velopment and democracy. Id. Developed nations need the help of developing countries
like India, Pakistan, and even underdeveloped nations like Somalia, as much as these
countries need the developed nations for trade.
288. See Cooper & Winestock, supra note 119, at Al (stating that "[iun an effort to keep
poorer nations on their side in the war on terrorism," United States and European nego-




D. Poverty Penalty and Loss to Pharmaceutical Industries
This section argues that the poverty penalty has in fact re-
sulted in a loss of opportunity cost to the pharmaceutical indus-
try. It questions the economic and legal viability of the pharma-
ceutical industry's policies that refuse to consider alternate but
mutually beneficial solutions.
The AIDS crisis in developing nations has altered the drug in-
dustry's standing in the United States.28 9 For example, immedi-
ately following the South African AIDS crisis, the drug industry's
dominance over the American trade policy suffered, leading to a
reversal of policy by the Clinton administration.290 The influence
over the Bush administration is circumscribed by the interna-
tional nature of the AIDS issue.291 The local paradigm shift has
enabled developing nations to consolidate their demands.292 The
289. See generally Rosenberg, supra note 259, at 26 (detailing that the breaking of the
"trade in fear" effect of violating IP laws has coincided with the internal pressures to fulfill
national responsibilities). The awareness that displeasing American pharmaceutical
manufacturers can no longer automatically land them on a trade watch list provides a
dramatic bargaining power for developing countries. Id.
290. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
291. See Adams & Hitt, supra note 136, at A3. See generally Rose, supra note 47.
292.' The WTO Ministerial Conference was held in Qatar on September 19, 2001. The
Conference highlighted the importance for WTO members to use the TRIPS flexibilities to
deal with pandemics. See WTO News: Members Discuss Drafts for Ministerial Declaration,
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Sept. 19, 2001 at http://www.wto.org/english/news-
e/news0le/trips-drugs_ 010919_e.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2004). The Conference cul-
minated in the Doha Declaration. See Doha Declaration, supra note 25, cls. 4, 5, 6. The
Declaration provides wide discretion to member countries. Id. Clause 5(b) of the declara-
tion, in granting the right to compulsory licensing, establishes the right to either seek re-
duction of price or local manufacture of drugs. Id. cl. 5(b). In recognition of the "special
needs" of developing nations, the Declaration validates establishment of generic drug in-
dustries locally, even during the patent term. Id. cl. 7. While maintaining commitments in
the TRIPS agreement, member states can establish national regimes of exhaustion and
determine whether and what constitutes a national emergency to compulsorily license [P
rights. The transition period for the least developing signatories extends until 2016 with a
right to seek further extensions. See TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 66(1). Article 65(1), read
with Article 66(1) of TRIPS, provides the least developed countries until 2005 to imple-
ment TRIPS. Id. arts. 65(1), 66(1). The Doha Declaration has extended the transition pe-
riod until 2016 specifically with reference to pharmaceutical products. See Doha Declara-
tion, supra note 25, cls. 5, 7. Part II of TRIPS deals with standards concerning the
availability, scope and use of IP rights. See TRIPS, supra note 3, Part II. Section 5 dis-
cusses standards for patent harmonization and section 7 discusses the standards for pro-
tection of undisclosed information. Id. Part 11.5. In countries where production of generic
drugs are impossible, Clause 6 delegates the task of seeking the solution to enable local
production of generic drugs. By the end of 2002, the Council for TRIPS was entrusted with
the task of finding an appropriate solution. Id. For a general discussion of the drug indus-
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resulting declaration at Doha ("Doha Declaration") established
that IP laws cannot operate exclisively from national responsi-
bilities.293 The Declaration itself represents a loss of opportunity
for the pharmaceutical industry to gain entry into the developing
nations' markets, which can be illustrated as follows.
The pharmaceutical industry refused the option of differential
or discounted pricing at the earlier stages of the AIDS crisis when
an epidemic infection could have been averted.294 Negotiating a
uniform discounted price for developing nations would have gen-
erated the following revenues for the pharmaceutical industry:
RevenueNegotited = X * (PriceNegotia) * (ConsumersN,,, a,)
Here, X represents all the developing nations that would have
embraced patented pharmaceuticals as required under TRIPS.
PriceNggoi represents the average negotiated price. Consumerso
tid represents the average number of consumers.
When AIDS assumed epidemic proportions, price cuts at a
much higher percentage occurred.295 Further bulk price discounts
replaced negotiated price cuts when third-world governments,
try's response to the World Trade talks in Qatar, see Gardiner Harris & Rachel Zimmer-
man, Drug Makers Say WTO Setback Will Not Have Significant Impact, WALL ST. J., Nov.
15, 2001, at B5.
293. See James Thuo Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J. L. & TECH.
291, 296 (2002). See generally 't Hoen, supra note 35, at 34-35.
294. TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper
Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, 7 Widener L. Symp. J. 175,
195 (2001).
295. Merck dropped the price of two antiretroviral drugs, Crixivan (indinavir sulfate)
and Stocrin (efavirenz), from $6,000 to $600 and $500, respectively. Sarah Bosely, Embar-
rassed Firms Slash AIDS Drug Prices, GUARDIAN, (March 12, 2001), available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/aids/story/ 0,7369,450388,00. html (last visited Mar. 31, 2004.).
Glaxo-SmithKline offered Combivir at $730 from $6,289. Gardiner Harris, AIDS Gaffes in
Africa Come Back To Haunt the Drug Industry in the U.S., WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2001, at
Al. Roche Holdings lowered prices by more than 63% of the original cost. See generally
Charlotte Denny, A Spoonful of Sugar Will Not Help, GUARDIAN, Apr. 19, 2001, available
at http'//www.guardian.co.uk/aids/story/0,7369, 475344,00.html (last visited Mar. 31,
2004); Rosenberg, supra note 259, at 26; Michael Waldholz & Rachel Zimmerman, Bristol-
Myers Offers to Sell Two AIDS Drugs in Africa at Below Cost, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2001,
at B1 (detailing that Bristol-Myers lowered its price well below cost and Merck lowered




unable to fulfill dire national responsibilities, assumed an offen-
sive posture. 296 This may be represented as:
RevenueD ounted = Y * (Price , . ) * (Consumersi..u.)
In this formula, Y represents countries embracing branded
pharmaceuticals-Y being less than X since countries with low
per capita income and high incidence of AIDS will embrace ge-
neric drugs. PriceDiuntod represents the discounted price in the
wake of the AIDS crisis. Consumers .... ted represents the in-
creased number of consumers since AIDS assumed epidemic pro-
portions.
Although the Priceviounled is less than the PriceNgotda d the in-
crease in Consumersimuned would offset the loss the pharmaceuti-
cal industry would suffer from discounting the prices." The real
cost to the industry because of failing to price differentially29 -
termed the "Late Negotiating Cost" ("LNC")-derived as follows:
LNC = (RevenueNegotated -RevenueDounte) + Revenuener
In this formula, Revenueckner = G * (Price e ) * (Consumers-
GeneQ where G represents countries using the option under clause
6 of the Doha Declaration to produce generic drugs locally-for
example, countries such as India, Brazil or Thailand.
The loss to the industry, owing to the legitimization of the ge-
neric drug industry, will largely be from the Revenue,,jc. That is,
an increase in RevenueCkneri will represent a proportionate loss of
opportunity for the pharmaceutical industry to tap the respective
markets.299 For example, the drug industry lost the opportunity
296. For example, Brazil's threat to compulsorily license AIDS drugs forced Merck to
slash prices of two AIDS drugs by 65% and 95%. Roche followed with a 40% discount, fi-
nally settling for a price 70% less than the original cost. See Rich, supra note 94, at Cl.
Brazil's reaction was triggered by Roche's refusal to reduce the cost of AIDS medication
beyond 13% of the cost. See Jennifer Rich & Melody Peterson, Brazil Will Defy Patent on
AIDS Drug Made by Roche, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2001, at C6.
297. The reduction in price has resulted in an increased volume of purchases by third-
world countries. For example, the Brazilian government is buying 20,000 daily doses of
Crixivan, Merck's brand of indinavir, a tenth of the drug's worldwide sales. See Rosenberg,
supra note 259, at 26. Moreover, the volume of sales remains high since people newly in-
fected with HIV become AIDS patients soon. Thus the increased volume sales compen-
sates for the reduction of prices. Id.
298. Differential pricing could either be different prices for different nations depending
on the per capita income and other relevant considerations specific to the nation, or a dif-
ferent price for developing and developed nations. See Brains v. Bugs, ECONOMIST, Nov.
10, 2001, at 6 (supporting the idea of differential pricing).
299. For example, in 1995 alone the USTR estimated a loss from the then illegitimate
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until 2016 to handhold least-developed nations into the product
patent regime. °° Least-developed nations are most likely to pro-
mote generic drug companies, for the obvious benefits, and will
not be the best potential future markets for the pharmaceutical
companies.
LNC is also affected by other intangible factors. For example,
within fifty years of its inception, the generic drug industry has
emerged as an alternate, affordable supplier of patented medica-
tion in developing countries. Countries like India, Thailand, and
Brazil even export the low-cost drugs. At a time when TRIPS was
interpreted strictly, without any flexibility, the generic drug in-
dustry managed not only to survive, but to legitimize itself
through the Doha Declaration.0 1 Given this fact, the probability
that the generic drug industry could consolidate itself in the fu-
ture is greater. If the industry consolidates, it will result in a fur-
ther erosion of market share for the "traditional" pharmaceutical
industry.0 2 Moreover, having gained the option to use generic
drugs, third-world governments could, in the future, resist in-
creases to drug prices thus keeping Price iwounted low, or Revenuecnri.
high. Developing nations, having consolidated their challenges to
branded pharmaceuticals, will use the strategy of altering the
pricing terms of patents to access medication. The pharmaceuti-
cal industry should work toward a solution that is mutually bene-
ficial. Instead, the pharmaceutical industry continues to lobby to
limit the Doha Declaration to specific diseases.0 3 Drug manufac-
turers presume that limiting the number of diseases falling
within the Doha Declaration will prevent undermining of their
patent rights. 3' The strategy of blocking developing nations from
Indian generic drugs at $450 million per annum. 1995-1996 USTR ANNUAL TRADE
REPORT: INDIA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/html/1995_india.html (last visited Mar.
31, 2004.).
300. The Doha Declaration exempts the least developing nations from the pharmaceu-
tical patents provisions in TRIPS. See Doha Declaration, supra note 25, cl. 6.
301. See id.
302. See Marilyn Chase, Lilly Plans, WALL ST. J., Jun. 5, 2003, at B1 (detailing that Eli
Lilly has embarked on a program to work with generic drug companies in India, China,
Russia, and South Africa to transfer the technology of making and marketing tuberculosis
drugs).
303. See Roger Thurow & Scott Miller, As U.S. Balks on Medicine Deal, African Pa-
tients Feel the Pain, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2003, at Al. Limiting the Doha Declaration to
specific diseases will result in depriving populations within developing nations of medica-




accessing drugs lacks legal validity and is distinctly shortsighted
for failing to take current global realities into consideration.0 5
This strategy lacks legal validity because the Doha Declaration
relates to HIV, malaria, and "other epidemics," thus establishing
that the term epidemics cannot be restrictively defined.0 6 Clause
4 of the Declaration subjects the TRIPS commitments to the
members' right to protect public health by promoting access to
"medicines for all."30 7 The Declaration also establishes the right of
members to interpret TRIPS in light of their public policy objec-
tives and establishes the use of the TRIPS flexibilities to protect
public health.0 8 Since an epidemic from any disease can poten-
tially affect public health, restricting the definition of "epidemics"
will violate the Doha commitment to public health. If the phar-
maceutical industry tries to restrict the definition of the term
"epidemics," developing nations are likely to argue that third-
world generic drugs fall within the definition of "flexibilities" and
thus will produce generics for all of the excluded diseases.30 9 The
term "epidemics" has been left undefined in the Doha Declara-
tion, enabling nations to decide what an epidemic is based on na-
tional standards.310 Hence the pharmaceutical industry's re-
stricted use of the term for its own benefit will be construed to
violate TRIPS.
305. Id. at A9. The industry's inability to forge long-term solutions has earned it a
reputation comparable to that of the tobacco industry. See Is Big Pharma the Next Target
for Attack?, ECONOMIST, Apr. 26, 2003, at 53 ("Big Tobacco, Big Banking-and now Big
Pharma? ... Like the tobacco firms and investment banks before them, drugs firms face a
dynamic, grass-roots movement, centered on the states and driven by powerful economics,
that by-passes their well-financed defences in Washington D.C."); see also Russell Gold &
Andrew Caffrey, States Suing Drug Makers Spurn Former Allies on Tobacco, WALL ST. J.,
May 29, 2002, at B1.
306. See Doha Declaration, supra note 25, cl. 5(c). Clause 5(c) establishes that develop-
ing nations can decide what an epidemic is and whether an epidemic is prevalent based on
national standards. "Each member has the right to determine what constitutes a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public
health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epi-
demics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency."
See id. cl. 1.
307. Id. cl. 4 ("[While reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm
that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner suppor-
tive of WTO Members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access
to medicines for all.").
308. Id. cl. 4.
309. Id. cl. 5.
310. Id. art. 1. In return for such freedom, countries have kept their sovereign com-
mitment not to reduce the line between important and necessary drugs.
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The strategy of blocking developing nations from access to
drugs is also shortsighted because, if deprivation of medication
and worsening disease conditions were the two decisive factors,
developing nations would have moved to the patent regime in the
1950s. Instead, this strategy led to the genesis of the generic drug
industry.311 A combined impact of several diseases in more than
one nation, even over a period of time, will be detrimental to
world economic progress. As more economies succumb to diseases,
the impact on trade will force a dilution of either pharmaceutical
patents or prices. Moreover, the strategy of depriving developing
nations of medication until they find the means to fund branded
products caused the WTO to reestablish the TRIPS Agreement's
public benefit rationale of patents through the Doha Declara-
tion.312 Continuing to deprive developing nations of essential
medication, even for a limited number of diseases, will increase
the prevailing suspicions over the ability of IP rights as incen-
tives and thus strengthen the generic drug industry.313 Even
311. The generic drug industry itself did not develop as a business model, but rather as
a desperate, alternate means to access drugs. Developing countries searched for alterna-
tives when they realized that the pricing structure of pharmaceuticals lacked a coherent
connection with local economic realities. For example, when India became independent in
1947, multinational drug companies supplied 90% of the medicines. The drug prices were
so high that in 1961, India ranked among the highest priced nations in the world for
drugs. Around 50% of India's population lived in poverty and were unable to afford drugs.
A United States Senate committee headed by Senator Estes Kefauver remarked that drug
prices in India were among the highest in the world. Around the same period, the first
five-year plan reflected that India had the largest reservoir of epidemic diseases, account-
ing for 5.1% of the total mortality. See GOV'T OF INDIA PLANNING COMM'N, FIRST FIVE-YEAR
PLAN § 32.3 (1956) [hereinafter FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN], available at http://planningcomis
sion.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/default.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2004); see also Press Re-
lease, The World Bank, India Shows Mixed Progress in the War Against Poverty (Aug. 25,
1997), at http://www.worldbank.org (last visited Mar. 31, 2004) (discussing mortality
rates). Making pharmaceuticals affordable became an emergency requirement. Since mul-
tinational drugs companies were not willing to negotiate cost, India established Hindustan
Antibiotic Limited in 1954 to manufacture drugs at a cheaper cost for the public. Hindu-
stan Antibiotics Limited Health-Care and Agrovet Products, Profile (1999), at
http://www.hindantibiotics.com/htdocs/profile.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2004). This first
step led to a thriving generic industry in India. Id. Critics argue that India would have
benefited more had they established a patent regime with thriving research and develop-
ment as early as 1950. Unfortunately, during that period, India neither had the financial
potential to invest in research and development nor did it possess the intellectual prowess
of the current period. The First Five-Year Plan records that a mere 14% of the population
was engaged in industry. See FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN, supra, § 2.3, available at
http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/default.html (last visited Mar. 31,
2004).
312. See generally Samuel Oddi, TRIPS-Natural Rights and a "Polite Form of Eco-
nomic Imperialism," 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415 (1996) (discussing natural rights and
suggesting strategies for developing countries to cope with TRIPS).
313. See Brains v. Bugs, supra note 298, at 6 (discussing the developing countries' sus-
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when deprivation of medication was combined with the threat of
a public health crisis and the pressure of trade sanctions, devel-
oping nations chose to legitimize the generic drug industry rather
than move toward a patent regime.314 As demonstrated above,
had the pharmaceutical industry averted health crises in impov-
erished nations by providing low cost drugs, it could have gained
entry into the developing country markets. By now, the industry
could have achieved the exclusivity it craves, since the generic
drug industry would not have developed. Instead, the industry
and developed nations overestimated the ability of economic sanc-
tions to force governments to trade social justice for economic
needs." 5
VI. SOLUTION
The possibility of a solution revolves around the question of
whether a legal regime can be devised with a TRIPS system that
caters to the needs of the developing nations, while at the same
time ensures a return on investment for the drug industry. The
drug industry's skepticism toward the impact of low-cost drugs
will be justified if the success of the third-world generics either
results in parallel importation or increases the demand within
the United States for cheap imports or price controls.
While Article 31 of TRIPS and the Doha Declaration categorize
specific remedies for countries facing a public health crisis, both
address different stages of the problem. Article 31 responds to
situations fulfilling the sovereign responsibility of providing im-
mediate and imminent treatment to use a patent, if required,
"without the authorization of the right holder."316 Article 31 may
be used to deal with an unexpected national public health emer-
gency.
picions that the pharmaceutical industry devotes only a very limited percentage of its as-
sets to research medication for diseases unique to developing nations). See generally Raga-
van, supra note 36.
314. See generally Doha Declaration, supra note 25.
315. Pricing realistically based on local economics can result in better return of in-
vestment rather than channeling enormous sums of money to find ingenious solutions to
safeguard the lucrative home markets from copying. Typically, the expenditure involves
promoting candidates who favor pharmaceutical patents, lobbying, advertisements, etc.
See Tom Hamburger, Drug Industry Moves to Boost Image Before Vote, WALL ST. J., Sept.
16, 2002, at A6.
316. See TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 31.
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The Doha Declaration, on the other hand, discusses measures
governments may take proactively to provide access to medica-
tion.317 The governmental right to take proactive measures was
introduced into the Declaration late in 2001.318 From 1992, when
TRIPS was signed, until 2001, TRIPS lacked legal language rec-
ognizing the ability of third-world governments to take preventa-
tive measures that could in fact be globally significant. 9 Clause
4 of the Declaration authorizes use of measures "supportive of the
WTO Members' right to protect public health and, in particular,
to promote access to medicines for all."3 20 On a plain reading it is
unclear whether governments' initiatives to "promote access to
medicines" should only be to protect public health as opposed to
preventing a public health crisis.32' However, Clause 4, if inter-
preted in light of the objectives of TRIPS as provided for under
Clause 5(a), will allow members to take proactive, preventive
measures. 322 Moreover, Clause 5 also provides the flexibility for
members to determine when a "circumstance[] of extreme ur-
gency" exists-as opposed to a national emergency-warranting
the use of TRIPS "flexibilities."323 Similarly, the "promote access
to medicines" portion of Clause 4 enables governments to estab-
lish generic drug industries locally.32 4 Special categories of mem-
bers, that cannot or are unable to effectively use the compulsory
317. Doha Declaration, supra note 25, cl. 4.
318. Id.
319. Id. See generally TRIPS, supra note 3.
320. Doha Declaration, supra note 25, cl. 4.
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Mem-
bers from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiter-
ating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agree-
ment can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive
of WTO Members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote
access to medicines for all.
Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. cl. 5(a). "[In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public interna-
tional law, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object
and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and principles."
Id.
323. Id. cl. 5.
324. Id. cl. 4; see Keith E. Maskus, Final Report to WIPO: Parallel Imports in Pharma-
ceuticals: Implications for Competition and Prices in Developing Nations (April 2001),
available at http://www.wipo.org/about-ipen/studies/pdf/ssa-maskus-pi.pdf (last visited
Mar. 31, 2004) (defining parallel importation as "goods produced genuinely under protec-
tion of a trademark, patent, or copyright, placed into circulation in one market, and then




licensing benefit due to lack of manufacturing capacity, are rec-
ognized under Clause 6.325
The pharmaceutical industry can work with governments pro-
moting access to medication, proactively, at low cost, subject to an
undertaking by the governments to prevent parallel importation.
Article 31 authorizes such restrictions in adding that any use of
compulsory licensing should be limited for domestic supply.32 6 The
industry may be able to separate out Clause 4 nations, which are
capable of using the compulsory licensing scheme by producing
low-cost generic drugs and Clause 6 nations which may be al-
lowed to import the medication from Clause 4 nations. The
agreements with the industry can be specifically designated to
limit the marketing rights of Clause 4 nations to cater only to
their national markets and to Clause 6 markets. In turn, the
Clause 4 nations will be eligible for transfer of technology to
make low-cost generic medication, according to Clause 7 of the
Doha Declaration read with Article 66(2) of TRIPS.327 Such
agreements can cater to the transfer of technology to private or
government parties approved by their respective governments to
manufacture generic medications. In return for the technology
transferred, the government should take the responsibility to
prevent parallel importation at all levels, including through the
Internet. Alternately, the industry can enter into agreements
with Clause 6 nations to market patented medication at marginal
cost or at comparable levels with the assurance from the respec-
tive government to prevent parallel importation. 28
Using the opportunity, the industry can also make extensive ef-
forts to educate people about intellectual property rights. This
scenario will create an environment more appreciative of IP
rights, rather than simply depriving the sick of medication. The
solution will have the advantage of introducing the patent system
in other fields of science and technology in developing nations,
which could ultimately pave the way for harmonized, uniform IP
regimes.
325. Doha Declaration, supra note 25, cl. 6.
326. TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 31.
327. Doha Declaration, supra note 25, cl. 7; TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 66(2).
328. Doha Declaration, supra note 25, cl. 6. In any case, some of the world's poorest
countries are in no economic position to even produce enough drugs for their national
needs let alone import them from developed nations. See Pill Paupers, ECONOMIST, Dec.
19, 2002, at 10-11 (arguing that if differential pricing does not work, then the developed
nations may be forced to bear the cost of some of the AIDS treatment for sheer lack of al-
ternatives).
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In devising a solution, the video and computer industries, by
example, demonstrate that re-importation of spurious products
can be curtailed without resorting to deprivation.329 Importantly,
there has not been a single case of large-scale re-importation to
substantiate the argument that deprivation is the only solution to
safeguard the home market. Had Microsoft and Intel decided to
shun India as a market because of copyright issues, India would
not have realized competitive position in the software industry.33 °
Instead, the investment of foreign software companies enables
the local industry to tackle piracy in India.33' Creating global
competitiveness in newer areas of trade complies with the objec-
tive of TRIPS, which in its preamble states that the special needs
of the least-developed countries are recognized to enable members
to "[c]reate a sound and viable technological base. 332
The advantage of countries like India assuming a dominant po-
sition in a particular trade is that the government then inter-
venes to contain piracy and to maintain international standards
of trade due to growing industry pressures. Governments respond
better when local industries empowered with international trade
aspects demand amendments in IP laws.333 Moreover, when
amendments are prompted by local businesses, it increases 'the
probability of the businesses contributing to the modernization of
IP.334 Part of the reason why third-world governments are unable
to implement IP laws after they are amended in accordance with
TRIPS is the cost involved.335 Getting the local businesses excited
about the prospects of international trade will alleviate the rigor
of this problem.
329. See generally KEITH E. MASKUS, INST. FOR INTL ECON., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 53-81 (2000).
330. See Software Piracy: Understanding the Larger Picture, Express Computers, July
21, 2003, available at http://www.expresscomputeronline.com/20030721/ indtrendl.shtml
(last visited Mar. 31, 2004) (describing the economic consequences of piracy on foreign di-
rect investment).
331. See Salmad Saeed, China & India-Major Global Economic Players by 2005: For-
eign Investors in India's Information Technology, THE SOUTH-ASIAN.COM, Jan. 2002, avail-
able at httpJ/www.the-south-asian.com/Jan2002/Technology-&-Investments-Foreign-
investments-in-India.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2004) (discussing the extent of foreign in-
vestments in software technology in India).
332. See TRIPS, supra note 3, pmbl.






Adam Smith remarked, "[w]hat is prudence in the conduct of
every private family, can scarce be folly in that of a great king-
dom."336 Similarly, what is prudence in the context of a nation
cannot become folly in international context. International eco-
nomic stability cannot, by definition, be enhanced from trade by
depleting individual nations of welfare. The economic case for en-
couraging developing nations to respect their commitments under
trade agreements cannot be made without a corresponding quid
pro quo from developing nations.33 ' The long-term costs of the
poverty penalty in ignoring welfare could undermine the quid pro
quo. It is an individual, as well as global interest, to ensure that
the WTO mechanism does not selectively flex only for problems
within developed nations. The uniform functioning of the WTO
mechanism to problems across the globe could eventually be the
factor that determines the survival of the mechanism in the long
run.
336. TODD G. BUCHHOLz, NEW IDEAS FROM DEAD ECONOMISTS 37 (1999) (quoting ADAM
SMITH, 1 WEALTH OF NATIONS 457 (1776)). Smith used the argument against merchants
who lobbied for protective tariffs and quotas from foreign goods.
337. See Sykes, supra note 17, at 60.
The economic case for encouraging nations to respect their commitments un-
der trade agreements has no quarrel with behavior that is consistent with
those commitments. But to the extent that what developing countries propose
to do with pharmaceutical patents is in tension with their TRIPS commit-
ments, deviation comes at the cost of undermining the credibility of commit-
ments, now and in the future.
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